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THE LEAD POISONING CHALLENGE:
AN APPROACH FOR CALIFORNIA AND
OTHER STATES
Clifford L. Rechtschaffen*

1.

INTRODUCTION

Lead poisoning is widely recognized as the most serious environmental health hazard facing young children today. 1 Even at
low levels of exposure, much lower than previously believed, lead
can impair the development of a child's central nervous system,
cause learning disabilities, and lead to serious behavioral problems. 2 Nationwide, nearly nine percent of children between ages
one and five have blood lead levels that exceed the Centers for
Disease Control's level of concem.3
The major source of childhood lead exposure is lead-based
paint in older homes. Although lead has been phased out of gasoline and other products, resulting in considerable reductions in
blood lead levels, little has been done to reduce hazards from
lead-based paint in private housing built before 1978.4 Except in a
very few states, there currently are no statutes that require owners
of private homes to test housing for lead hazards or to take steps
to control identified lead hazards. s Nor are there any clearly established standards to follow for owners who want to control lead
hazards voluntarily. 6 Federal laws have been largely limited to
* Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Environmental Law and Justice
Clinic, Golden Gate University School of Law, J.D., Yale Law School, 1984; A.B.,
Princeton University, 1978. During 1995 and 1996, the author was a member of the
California drafting committee that developed the legislation discussed in this Article. The
opinions expressed herein reflect the views of the author only, however. Julie Coldicott
and Frank Howard provided valuable research assistance. Special thanks to the staff at
Lead Safe California for their extraordinary help in gathering material for this Article and
to Nick Farr, Karen Kramer, Wally Oman, Jane Schukoske, and Ellen Widess for reviewing
earlier drafts of the Article.
1. See LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARD REDUCTION AND FINANCING TASK FORCE,
PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: CONTROLLING LEAD HAZARDS IN THE NATION'S HousING, REPORT OF THE LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARD REDUCTION AND FINANCING TASK
FORCE 2 (1995) [hereinafter TITLE X TASK FORCE].
2. See infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
3. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 71-73.
5. See infra Part V.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 211-212.

387

388

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 21

dealing with lead in federally owned and assisted housing units,
and more recent federal statutes leave the establishment of standards of care to the states. 7 In almost all jurisdictions, the existing
state and local laws focus on responding to identified cases of
lead-poisoned children-addressing the problem after children have
been poisoned, rather than preventing hazards from occurring in
the first place. 8 This is particularly undesirable because most of the
health problems caused by lead poisoning are untreatable. 9
At the same time, changes in the legal landscape underscore
the need for appropriate standards of care that address lead hazards. As of the fall of 1996, federal law requires owners of all
private housing built before 1978 to inform prospective tenants and
purchasers of the risks of lead paint and of any known lead hazards
in the units, creating market incentives to properly address leadbased paint hazards. IO The secondary mortgage market is already
requiring owners to test their properties and comply with local lead
abatement ordinances}! Tort litigation against property owners and
a host of other potentially responsible entities will almost certainly
multiply in the next few years, as a growing number of children
are tested and diagnosed with lead poisoning and as public awareness of lead poisoning continues to rise. 12 An increasing number of
localities have been adopting their own lead ordinances, raising the
strong possibility that property owners soon will be subject to
divergent local standards. 13
This Article describes a comprehensive framework for addressing lead-based paint hazards that balances the panoply of competing interests and affected stakeholders. The framework is broadly
applicable to the overwhelming number of states that have not yet
adopted preventative lead laws; 14 this Article focuses in particular
on California to illustrate the types of challenges that these states
are likely to confront. The proposed approach is based on the
recommendations of a congressionally mandated national task force,
7. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 216-218.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 90-96.
II. See infra text accompanying notes 97-100.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 173-184.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 194-207.
14. Only three states have adopted such laws: Massachusetts, Maryland, and Vermont. See infra notes 222-257 and accompanying text.
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modified to address the specific needs of California. Recognizing
the enormity of the lead-based paint problem (over 8.6 million
housing units in California may have lead-based paint)IS and the
paramount importance of preserving affordable housing stock, the
proposed approach moves away from full-scale, expensive abatement of lead hazards in favor of more cost-efficient, health-protective measures. It provides for clear standards of care by property
owners,16 a measure of tort liability relief for compliant owners in
the event they are sued for injuries,17 and a strong incentive for
insurers to begin providing coverage for lead-related injuries. IS It
also mandates lead-safe work practices by contractors and encourages the development of a well-trained lead hazard control industry.19 The approach relies in part on market forces that will be
triggered by mandatory disclosures of the risks of lead in private
housing. 20
In 1996, legislation incorporating the key elements of this
approach was introduced in California. The proposal resulted from
a two-year collaborative process in which representatives from the
numerous interests affected by lead-based paint in housing-landlords, tenants, doctors, lenders, bankers, realtors, insurers, children's advocates, labor, risk assessors, environmental groups, governmental agencies, and trial lawyers-met to discuss and draft
legislation. While this legislation failed to advance out of the State
Senate, it offers enormous potential for addressing the state's lead
poisoning problems, and the opportunity for California to avoid the
lead-related litigation explosion experienced in other states. 21 It
also presents a model that other states can follow.
Part II of this Article outlines the problems posed by childhood lead poisoning. Part III describes the current legal scheme for
dealing with lead-based paint in homes and explains why it is
ineffective. Part IV discusses the need for a new approach for
dealing with lead-based paint hazards. Part V outlines preventative
15. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 281-300 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part VI.B.3.
18. See infra Part VI.B.4.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 304-312.
20. See infra Part VI.B.1.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 173-184. The California legislation was
reintroduced during the 1997 legislative session. See infra note 271 and accompanying
text.
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lead statutes recently enacted by other states. Part VI describes the
comprehensive framework for addressing lead-based paint hazards
in California developed by the collaborative drafting process. Part
VII explores the next steps for the state to follow in order to get
this framework enacted into law. Part VIII examines some lessons
from California's experience with a multiparty drafting process
that can be applied to other efforts in the consensual resolution of
environmental disputes.
II.

BACKGROUND ON CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING

A. The Nature of the Problem
The hazards of lead have been recognized for centuries. 22 In
the United States, however, for most of this century lead was
widely used in paint, gasoline, consumer products, and industrial
processes because of its convenient and versatile properties. 23 As a
consequence, lead is ubiquitous in the human environment.
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, "lead poisoning remains the most common and societally devastating environmental disease of young children."24 Children under age six are
at greatest risk because their rapidly developing nervous systems
are particularly vulnerable to lead, because they tend to be exposed
to more lead than adults, and because their absorption rates are
higher. 25 Unborn children are also at risk, since a mother and fetus
share a common blood supply, and lead can pass from the woman
to her fetus across the placenta.26 Even at relatively low levels, lead
22. In the 1920s, after an epidemic of childhood lead poisonings from paint was
reported, many countries, including Great Britain, Spain, Tunisia, Sweden, Belgium, Cuba,
Yugoslavia, Poland, and Greece, banned or severely restricted lead-based paint. See R.
Rabin, Warnings Unheeded: A History of Child Lead Poisoning, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1668, 1668 (1989); see also Karla A. Francken, Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Liability:
Wisconsin Realtors, Residential Property Owners and Landlords Beware, 77 MARQ. L.
REV. 550, 550 (1994).
23. See KAREN L. FLORINI ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, LEGACY OF
LEAD: AMERICA'S CONTINUING EPIDEMIC OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING 15-22 (1990).
24. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING at xi (1991)
[hereinafter CDC STRATEGIC PLAN].
25. See FLORINI ET AL., supra note 23, at 1-2.
26. See id. at 24. Low level lead exposures also have significant health impacts for
adults, including reproductive effects and increased risks of cancer, and high blood
pressure. See id. at 9-10, 25. Moreover, recent studies suggest that unexpectedly low levels
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poisoning can impair the development of a child's central nervous
system, which can cause learning disabilities, decreased intelligence, impaired growth, hearing loss, limited attention span, and
behavioral problems.27 At higher levels, lead can cause coma, convulsions, and death. 28 Low-level lead poisoning is an asymptomatic
disease; children poisoned at low blood-lead levels may not manifest obvious symptoms of lead poisoning. 29 For these children,
blood lead level testing is the only way to determine if they are
poisoned. 30
Lead causes other social problems as well. A recent study
links elevated lead levels in young boys with aggressive acts and
delinquent behavior.31 These behaviors have been shown to be strong
predictors of criminal behavior in later life. 32 Earlier studies found
that children with moderately elevated blood-lead levels in early
childhood later showed seven-fold increases in school dropout rates,
six-fold increases in reading disabilities, lower final high school
class standing, and higher absenteeism.33
The recognized level for lead toxicity in the United States has
been lowered dramatically over the past three decades, from bloodlead levels of 60 micrograms per deciliter of whole blood (%g/dL)
of lead can cause high blood pressure and kidney impairment. See Denise Grady, Unexpected
Dangers Found in Low Levels of Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1996, at C1. One of these
studies found that hypertension has a closer link with lead levels than with smoking,
alcohol, or salt in the diet. See id.
27. See CDC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 24, at 9; FLORINI ET AL., supra note 23,
at 6-9.
28. See CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION 1 (1991) [hereinafter CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION].

29. See id.
30. See FLORINI ET AL., supra note 23, at 7. For this reason, public health experts
recommend that virtually all children be screened for lead poisoning. See CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING LEAD
POISONING IN YOUNG CHILDREN: A STATEMENT BY THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
39-45 (1991) [hereinafter CDC STATEMENT].
31. See Herbert L. Needleman et al., Bone Lead Levels and Delinquent Behavior,
275 JAMA 363, 363 (1995) [hereinafter Needleman et aI., Bone Lead Levels]. The findings
held true even when controlling for other predictors of delinquent behavior, such as
socioeconomic status, quality of child rearing, and maternal intelligence. See id. at 365,
368.
32. See id. at 367. An earlier study by Deborah Denno found that lead poisoning in
boys was the most significant predictor of disciplinary problems and among the most
significant predictors of delinquency and adult criminality. See generally DEBORAH W.
DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE (1990).
33. See FLORINI ET AL., supra note 23, at 8 & n.22 (citing Herbert L. Needleman
et aI., The Long-Term Effects of Exposure to Low Doses of Lead in Childhood: An 11- Year
Followllp Report, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 83, 83-88 (1990».
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in the mid-1960s to the current level, set by the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control in 1991, of 10 %g/dL.34 This decrease reflects an
increasing awareness of the dangers of lead in the environment.
Nationwide, 8.9% of children between ages one and five (1.7 million children) have blood-lead levels above 10 %g/dL, the Centers
for Disease Control level of concern. 3S In California, where one in
five children under age six lives in housing built before 1950,36 the
percentage is probably comparable. The California Department of
Realth Services ("DRS") estimates that, at any point in time, over
a quarter of a million children in California will have blood-lead
levels greater than 10 %g/dL.37 Between January 1991 and April
1995, over 3000 children in California were diagnosed with blood
lead levels above 25 %g/dL (a level warranting serious medical
intervention), based on testing of only fifteen percent of the state's
children. 3s DRS, perhaps conservatively, estimates that there are over
14,000 children in the state with blood-lead levels over 25 %g/dL.39
Lead poisoning disproportionately affects low-income children
and children of color. These children are more likely to live in
older, poorly maintained housing stock, have more .limited access
to health care, and are more likely to suffer from malnutrition. 40
Nationally, low-income children are four times more likely to have
elevated blood-lead levels than are upper-income children, and African American children are four times more likely to have elevated
blood-lead levels than are white children. 41 More than one-third of
African American children living in large cities have elevated blood
lead levels. 42

34. See CDC STATEMENT, supra note 30, at 1-2, 7-8. There is no level of lead
exposure that is considered safe, and some public health experts believe that exposure
presents a "continuum of toxicity." See id. at 2; see also FLORINI ET AL., supra note 23,
at 11-13 (noting that the emerging view is that lead has health effects at all levels).
35. See Debra I. Brody et aI., Blood Lead Levels in the U.S. Population: Phase I
of the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III, 1988-1991),
272 lAMA 277, 281 (1994).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 54-55.
37. See CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION BRANCH, CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH
SERVS., CALIFORNIA CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: DATA FROM RESPONSE AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (1996).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See FLORINI ET AL., supra note 23, at 13. Lead's effects are aggravated in people
who lack adequate essential trace minerals, such as calcium and iron. See id.
41. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 3.
42. See id. Close to 37% of African American children and 17% of Mexican
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.However, contrary to popular misconception, lead poisoning
cuts across racial and class-based lines because of the pervasiveness of lead-based paint in older housing. 43 Exposures may result
from construction or remodeling activities that disturb lead paint,
from ordinary wear and tear of windows and doors, or from friction
on other surfaces. In fact, in absolute numbers, as opposed to
percentages of affected subgroups, children living above the poverty level comprise the largest group at risk from lead exposure. 44
There is no known cure for lead poisoning, and the damage
caused by lead is generally considered irreversible.45 Lead poisoning, however, is largely preventable through the control of lead
hazards in children's environments.
B. Sources of the Problem

The most significant source of childhood lead exposure is
lead-based paint and the accompanying contaminated dust and soil
found in older homes.46 Exposure may also result from leaded
pipes, drinking water fountains and faucets, certain types of ceramics, "non-Western" traditional medicines, and cosmetics.47 Children
may also be exposed to lead dust when workers corne horne with
lead dust on their clothing or bring waste material horne from
work. 48 Leaded gasoline was a major source of lead exposure through

American children aged one to five living in large cities have blood-lead levels over 10
Ilg/dL compared to 4.5% for all races. See Brody et aI., supra note 35, at 279.
43. See Jane Brody, Personal Health, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995, at B8 (''Many
affluent parents are unduly complacent because they assume incorrectly that lead poisoning
is a ghetto disease or that it is not a problem in the area where they live.").
44. See FLORINI ET AL., supra note 23, at 7,24.
45. See id. at 27. A medical procedure known as chelation may be used to draw
some lead out of the body of a person with a very high blood-lead level (40 Ilg/dL or
higher) to prevent convulsions, coma, or death. See id. at 27-28. But chelation is not a
cure for lead poisoning, cannot reverse any adverse health effects that already have
occurred, and is expensive. See id.
46. See OFFICE OF LEAD-BASED PAINT ABATEMENT AND POISONING PREVENTION,
U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION AND
CONTROL OF LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARDS IN HOUSING 1-6 (1995) [hereinafter HUD
GUIDELINES].
47. See CDC STATEMENT, supra note 30, at 20-25.
48. See FLORIN! ET AL., supra note 23, at 21-22. Occupational exposures to lead
occur in a variety of industrial settings, including the secondary smelting and refining of
nonferrous metals, car battery production, automotive repair shops, salvage work, and
others. See id.
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the 1970s, and millions of tons of lead used in gasoline remain in
dust and soil. 49
Lead-based paint was widely used on homes until the middle
part of this century. Over ninety percent of homes built before 1950
contain lead-based paint, and paint produced through the 1940s had
high concentrations of lead pigment, in some cases up to fifty
percent lead by weight. 50 Homes built between 1950 and 1978
contain lead paint with reduced levels of lead,51 but lead-based
paint (defined as paint containing more than 0.06% lead by weight)
was not banned from residential use until 1978 by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission.52 Nationally, it is estimated that leadbased paint remains in 57 million private housing units built before
1980.53 In California, twenty percent of the state's housing stock,

49. See CDC STATEMENT, supra note 30, at 19. Since lead does not decompose or
biodegrade, it remains toxic indefinitely. See FLORINI ET AL., supra note 23, at 15.
Children,thus continue to be exposed to lead in the environment. See id. at 18. Lead in
gasoline was reduced in 1973 and 1985, see CDC STATEMENT, supra note 30, at 23, and
was eliminated entirely as a result of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(n) (1994). This phase-out is credited with the notable decline in blood lead levels
observed during the late 1970s and 1980s. See Needleman et aI., Bone Lead Levels, sllpra
note 31, at 369 (reporting that, from 1976 to 1991, average blood-lead levels in children
have decreased from 13.7 JlgldL to 3.2 Jlg/dL); see also TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note
I, at 35 (reporting that mean blood-lead level of overall population dropped 78%, from
12.8 to 2.8 Jlg/dL, over the period between 1976 and 1980, and 1988 and 1991).
The federal government has to some degree addressed other sources of lead
exposure. The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") limited the leachable content of
glazed ceramicware in 1971. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 182 (1st ed. 1992). In 1978, the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") adopted health-based ambient air quality standards for lead
under the Clean Air Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 50.12 (1996). The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA") adopted workplace exposure standards for lead in 1978.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1996). Under the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300f-300j (1994), Congress banned the use of lead in public drinking water distribution
systems and limited the lead content of solder, pipes, and faucets. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-6
(1994). Under 1991 regulations adopted by EPA, public water systems must reduce lead
contamination. See Lead and Copper Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 141.80-.91 (1996). Working with
FDA, the food industry significantly reduced its use of lead-soldered cans during the
1980s: in 1980, 47% of domestically produced food and soft drink cans were lead-soldered; by 1989, this figure was estimated to be 1.4%. See CDC STRATEGIC PLAN, Sllpra
note 24, at 23-24. Cans manufactured outside the United States, however, may still contain
lead solder. See id.
50. See CDC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 24, at 18.
51. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 69-70. Lead-based paint was used
less frequently between 1950 and 1978, and paint produced after the 1940s generally had
much lower lead concentrations. See id.
52. See 16 C.F.R. § 1303.1-.5 (1996) (banning use of paints with greater than
0.06% lead by weight); see also CDC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 24, at 18 (discussing
lead levels in homes and paint).
53. See CDC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 24, at 18.
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over 2.2 million housing units, was built before 1950.54 Approximately 560,000 children under age six live in these unitS.55 The San
Francisco/Oakland and Los AngeleslLong Beach metropolitan areas rank in the top ten metropolitan areas nationwide for children
at risk from lead hazards in pre-1950 homes. 56 Over seventy-five
percent of the state's housing stock (8.6 million units) was built
before 1978 and may contain lead-based paint. 57
Lead enters the environment as tiny lead particles and lead
dust disperse when paint chips, chalks, peels, wears away over
time, or is otherwise disturbed. Ingestion of lead dust (not, as
many believe, eating paint chips) is the most common pathway of
childhood poisoning; lead dust gets on children's hands and toys
and then into children's mouths through common hand-to-mouth
activity. 58 Due to its small particle size, lead dust may not be
visible to the naked eye and is difficult to clean. Common household cleaning practices may exacerbate the problem; for example,
sweeping and vacuuming can disperse lead dust. Children are also
exposed to soil that is contaminated with lead from deteriorating
exterior paints or other sources (prior industrial uses or gasoline),59
and may ingest the lead as part of normal play and hand-to-mouth
activity. 60
The mere presence of lead-based paint does not necessarily
constitute a health hazard; whether the paint is intact and in good
condition or is disturbed and deteriorating is far more important. 61
Poorly maintained housing units with deteriorating lead-based paint
54. CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION BRANCH, CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH
SERVS., CALIFORNIA CENSUS DATA ON CHILDREN AND HOUSING (1996) [hereinafter
CALIFORNIA CENSUS DATA] (based on 1990 United States Census).
55. See CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION, supra note 28, at 4.
56. See id.
57. See CALIFORNIA CENSUS DATA, supra note 54. Fifty-seven percent of the state's
housing stock was built between 1950 and 1979. See id.
58. See FLORINI ET AL., supra note 23, at 17. Less commonly, children may chew
on intact painted surfaces such as windowsills. See id.
59. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 4. Soil in parts of California is highly
contaminated with lead. The California Department of Health Services estimates that
approximately 1.558 billion pounds of lead were used in paint and petroleum products in
California from 1929 to 1986. See CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION BRANCH,
CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., SUMMARY OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION
IN CALIFORNIA 3 (1995).
60. See CDC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 24, at 20.
61. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 5 (''The Task Force emphasizes the
distinction between the mere presence of lead-based paint versus the existence of leadbased paint hazards.").
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pose the greatest risks of exposure. 62 Even in well-maintained housing, however, lead dust may result from ordinary wear and tear or
friction on surfaces with lead-based paint, or from deteriorating
paint. 63 Moreover, ordinary construction and renovation or repainting activities carried out without lead-safe work practices can disturh lead-based paint and create significant hazards; there have
been many reported cases of childhood lead poisoning resulting
from such activities. 64 Improper removal practices, such as dry
scraping, sanding, or water-blasting painted surfaces, are likely to
generate high volumes of lead dust. 65 The problem is exacerbated
by the small number of workers and contractors in California and
other states who are properly trained to evaluate and control lead
hazards.66
III.

THE EXISTING LEGAL LANDSCAPE ADDRESSING LEAD-BASED
PAINT HAZARDS

Although the federal government has recently reoriented and
improved its approach to dealing with lead-based paint hazards,
current federal law still largely addresses only federally assisted
housing units.67 Congress has left states with the responsibility of
remedying the problem of lead-based paint hazards in private housing.
A. Federal Law

Congress first seriously addressed the problem of lead-based
paint hazards in 1971, with the passage of the Lead-Based Paint
Poisoning Prevention Act ("LPPPA").68 This statute authorized the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to elimi-'
62. See id.
63. See CDC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 24, at 19. Lead on window components,
for instance, is of particular concern because it is abraded into dust by the repeated
opening and closing of windows. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Lead in Paint: Controlling the Hazard, 60 CONSUMER REP. 460, 460 (1995)
[hereinafter Lead in Paint]. Improperly scraping or sanding a single square foot of
lead-based paint can create lead dust levels close to one hundred times safe levels. See id.
66. See infra text accompanying note 305.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-4846 (1994).
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nate lead-based paint in public housing, and to eliminate leadbased paint hazards "as far as practicable" in federally assisted
housing. 69 The statute imposed no concrete deadlines for abatement, however, and HUD implemented the Act's provisions slowly
and interpreted them narrowly.7° The magnitude of removing all the
lead-based paint in federal housing paralyzed the agency.71 The
statute also did little to prompt lead hazard reduction in private
housing. A 1990 HUD report found that abatement of lead-based
paint had been accomplished in only a small fraction of dwellings
containing such paint. 72 Congress concluded in 1992 that, despite
the LPPPA, "the Federal response to this national crisis remains
severely limited."73
Recognizing the failure of prior efforts, Congress adopted the
Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (commonly referred to as "Title X"),74 which fundamentally reoriented
the federal government's approach to lead-based paint hazards. As
Professor Jane Schukoske points out, Title X embodies an "environmental paradigm" rather than a "housing paradigm" as a means
of addressing lead-based paint hazards. 75 The environmental paradigm emphasizes identification .and control of hazards, with estab69. See id. § 4822.
70. See Martha R. Mahoney, Four Million Children at Risk: Lead Paint Poisoning
Victims and the Law, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 46, 65-66 (1990). For example, HUD
consistently used the presence of a lead-poisoned child, rather than the condition of
housing, as a trigger to test units for lead-based paint hazards. See id. at 66-67. Congress
also failed to authorize sufficient funding to carry out the necessary control work. See id.
at 66. Congress amended the LPPPA in 1988 to mandate explicitly that HUD use housing
conditions as the basis for determining lead hazards, but HUD's implementation was again
slow and ineffective. See id. at 67-68.
71. See ALLIANCE TO END CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING & THE NATIONAL CENTER
FOR LEAD-SAFE HOUSING, A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION TO MAKE PRIVATE HOUSING
LEAD-SAFE at i (1993) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION].
72. See Jane Schukoske, The Evolving Paradigm of Laws on Lead-Based Paint:
From Code Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S.C. L. REv. 510, 513 & n.5 (1994)
[hereinafter Schukoske, Evolving Paradigm].
73. Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 4851
(1994). This Act was adopted by Congress in 1992 in response to reports of chronic lead
poisoning in children and the apparent failure of the LPPPA. See also FLORINI ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 3 (noting that implementation of key LPPPA provisions faltered from
the start); Jennifer Tiller, Easing Lead Paint Laws: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 18
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 265, 266 (1994) (noting that LPPPA did not significantly reduce
the incidence of childhood lead poisoning, primarily because of poor implementation).
74. Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3897 (Oct. 28, 1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2681-2692 (1994), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4822, 4851-4856 (1994), and other scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
75. See Schukoske, Evolving Paradigm, supra note 72, at 539.
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lished clear standards, disclosure to the public of the presence of
lead-based paint and lead-based paint hazards, and interdisciplinary study of lead hazard issues. 76 The housing paradigm reflected
in the LPPPA and most existing state statutes, by contrast, elevates
the rights of property owners over their responsibilities to the
public, allows owners to remain ignorant of lead-based paint hazards on their property, and does not require testing or control of
hazards.77
Title X redefined lead-based paint hazards to mean not merely
the presence of lead-based paint, but also the presence of conditions that cause harmful exposures to lead.78 Moreover, recognizing
that over half of the U.S. housing stock has some lead-based paint,
and that permanently removing this paint would cost hundreds of
billions of dollars,79 the law's focus is on making housing "lead
safe," by eliminating conditions that result in exposure of children.80 This strategy aims to reduce lead poisoning through a com76. See id. at 539-59.
77. See id. at 525-36; see also infra text accompanying notes 216-218.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 485Ib(15) (1994). A lead-based paint hazard is defined as "any
condition that causes exposure to lead from lead-contaminated dust, lead-contaminated
soil, or lead-contaminated paint that is deteriorated or present in accessible surfaces,
friction -surfaces, or impact surfaces that would result in adverse human health effects as
established by the appropriate Federal agency." ld. Under this definition, intact lead-based
paint on most waIls and ceilings would not be considered a hazard. See HUD GUIDELINES,
supra note 46, at xx.
79. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARDS-ABATEMENT STANDARDS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE AVAILABILITY OF INSURANCE, GAOIRCED94-231 (1994) {hereinafter ABATEMENT STANDARDS]. In 1990, HUD estimated that the
total cost of testing for and removing lead-based paint from a residence was about $8,000
and that the total of such costs for all pre-1980 privately owned housing was about
$500 billion over a lO-year period. See id.
80. See HUD GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at xx.
The most difficult question in lead-based paint hazard control derives from
resource limitations: How can the cost-effectiveness of lead hazard control be
maximized so children's lead exposure in housing can be sharply reduced
without unnecessarily adding to the cost of housing?
In confronting this problem, Congress provided in Title X a framework to
aIlow governmental officials, property owners, participants in the real estate
industry, and specialists in lead-based paint hazard control to tailor sensible
and effective lead hazard control programs to fit the financial and environmental conditions of specific properties. In effect, the immediate goal is to
make housing lead-safe rather than lead-free.

ld.; see also ALLIANCE TO END CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING, UNDERSTANDING TITLE X:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE RESIDENTIAL LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARD REDUCTION ACT
OF 1992 at 3 (1993) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING TITLE X] ("The fact that over half the
U.S. housing stock has some [lead-based paint] makes using [the presence of any and all
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bination of lead hazard evaluations and both short term and long
term interim control measures, rather than through the total elimination of lead paint. 8! To ensure the development of a well-qualified
lead hazard evaluation and control industry, Title X requires that
all risk assessors, inspectors, lead abatement workers and contractors be trained and certified. 82
Title X directly addresses control of lead-based paint hazards
only in federally assisted housing (housing owned, insured, or
subsidized by the federal government).83 For the first time, it imposes specific deadlines for lead hazard evaluation and control in
such housing, and also extends hazard control requirements to units
receiving more than $5,000 in project-based assistance under any
federal housing or community ~evelopment program. 84 Pursuant to
lead-based paint as an actionable hazard] to set priorities and target resources impractical
. . . . Therefore, Title X focuses attention and resources on situations believed to present
lead exposure hazards.").
81. See HUD GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at xxi-xxiii, 12-7 to 12-9; JiTLE X TASK
FORCE, supra note 1, at 7-14; UNDERSTANDING TITLE X, supra note 80, at 3. Lead hazard
controls fall into three general categories: (1) interim controls, (2) abatement of lead-based
paint hazards, and (3) abatement (or elimination) of lead-based paint. See HUD GUIDELINES,
supra note 46, at 1-10. Interim controls are measures designed to reduce temporarily human
exposure or likely exposure to lead-based paint hazards. See id. "Abatement of lead-based
paint hazards" refers to measures that reduce or eliminate lead-based paint hazards for at
least 20 years; this includes, but is not limited to, abatement of lead-based paint. See id.
at 1-10, 12-7. Abatement of lead-based paint, the most far-reaching abatement technique,
involves permanent control or elimination of all lead-based paint. See id. at 1-10. See also
infra Part VI.B.l (discussing what these controls entail). This terminology is confusing,
because "abatement" traditionally has been associated with the removal of all lead-based
paint (Le., the third category of lead hazard controls). See HUD GUIDELINES, supra note
46, at 12-7. Title X specifically redefined "abatement" to mean the elimination of
lead-based paint hazards, not necessarily all lead-based paint. See id. at 1-10.
By emphasizing control of lead-based paint hazards, Congress sought to avoid a
replay of the asbestos experience in the 1980s, when exaggerated fears over the health
impacts of asbestos in buildings led to widespread, full-scale removal activities. See James
A. Commins, A Dollar and Sense Approach to Asbestos Abatement, Focus, Jan. 28, 1987,
at 84. Because asbestos is a hazard only when old and crumbling, however, expensive
removal efforts were often unnecessary, and, when performed improperly, created far
greater health hazards than if the asbestos had been left undisturbed. See id. The lead-based
paint situation has some important parallels in that complete removal of lead-based paint
is usually unnecessary, and improper removal activities can generate much higher levels
of lead dust (and harmful exposure) than if paint in good condition is left intact. See HUD
GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 12-7 to 12-8.
82. See Toxic Substances Control Act (''TSCA'') § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 2682 (1994).
Specifically, EPA is required to issue training and certification regulations to ensure that
contractors engaged in lead-based paint activities in pre-I978 public housing and child
care facilities are trained and certified; that training programs are accredited; and that
standards are set for performing lead-based paint activities. See id. EPA issued these
regulations in August 1996. See 40 C.P.R. § 745 (1996).
83. See UNDERSTANDING TiTLE X, supra note 80, at 2.
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 4822 (1994).
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the statute, HUD has adopted guidelines for lead hazard evaluation
and control activities conducted in federally owned or assisted
housing, or carried out with federal financial assistance. 85 The guidelines identify a range of strategies to control lead hazards, including interim measures and long term abatement of lead hazards, and
confirm Title X's shift from the prior approach of trying to remove
all lead-based paint. 86 The HUD guidelines are likely to become
the de facto standards for states and localities to follow in the
absence of local standards. 87
But Title X does not prescribe standards of care for lead-based
paint in private housing. Congress left to the states the task of
developing standards for hazard evaluation and control of leadbased paint, as well as related liability, financing, insurance, and
other issues,88 "most of which were too controversial to be resolved
through the legislative process of Title X."89 Congress did seek to
prompt lead hazard control efforts indirectly in private housing,
however, by imposing disclosure requirements on private property
owners. Title X requires sellers and lessors to disclose the presence
of any kilown lead-based paint or lead-based paint hazards prior to
the sale or rental of any pre-1978 housing unit. 90 Sellers and lessors
must also provide purchasers or lessees with any lead hazard evalu85. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4851b(9), 4852c (1994); HUD GUIDELINES, slIpra note 46, at

1-4.
86. See HUD GUIDELINES, slIpra note 46, at xxi-xiii, 12-7 to 12-9.
87. Title X also required EPA to issue regulations that identify "lead-based paint
hazards, lead-contaminated dust, and lead-contaminated soil" by April 28, 1994. See 15
U.S.C. § 2683 (1994). EPA issued interim guidance in July 1994; final regulations have
been delayed beyond March 1997. See Memorandum from the U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency Region IX, Status of EPA Regulations Mandated by Title X at 1 (Mar. 1997) (on
file with author). EPA is also preparing a rule requiring that renovators and remodelers
distribute an informational pamphlet about lead hazards. See id. at 2. This rule is required
by section 406(a)&(b) of TSCA. See 15 U .S.C. § 2686 (1994). The pamphlet, Protect YOllr
Family From Lead in YOllr Home, that renovators and remodelers will have to distribute is
the same one required by section 1018 of Title X, the residential disclosure rule discussed
infra at notes 90-92 and accompanying text. See 42 U.S.C. § 4852d (1994); see also
Memorandum from the U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Region IX, SlIpra, at 2.
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 4852a (1994).
89. UNDERSTANDING TITLE X, slIpra note 80, at 14.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(a) (1994). HUD's and EPA's joint implementing regulations interpret the knowledge requirement of section 4852d(a)(1)(C) to mean actual
knowledge. See Requirements for Disclosure of Known Lead-Based Paint and/or LeadBased Paint Hazards Upon Sale or Lease of Housing, 24 C.F.R. § 35.8 (1996). Sellers and
lessors must also disclose any additional information available concerning known leadbased paint or lead-based paint hazards, such as the basis for determining the existence
of the paint or hazards, the locatioll of the paint or hazards, and the condition of the
painted surfaces. See 24 C.F.R. § 35.88(a)(2) (1996); 40 C.F.R. § 745.107(a)(2) (1996).
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ation reports available to the seller or lessor,91 and also with a lead
hazard information pamphlet prepared by EPA.92 All sales and rental contracts must also contain a "Lead Warning Statement."93 Rental units that are found to be free of lead-based paint are exempt
from the requirements. 94 Additionally, sellers must provide buyers
with a ten day opportunity to conduct a risk assessment or inspec-

91. See 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(a)(I)(B) (1994). '~vailable evaluation reports" means
records and reports that "pertain to lead-based paint andlor lead-based paint hazards" in
the housing that are in the possession of the seller or lessor or are reasonably obtainable
by the seller or lessor. See 40 C.P.R. § 745.103 (1996). This includes records and reports
regarding common areas as well as other residential units in a multifamily property where
the information is part of a property-wide evaluation or control effort. See 24 C.ER.
§ 35.86, .88(a)(4); 40 C.ER. § 745.103, .107(a)(4).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(a)(I)(A) (1994). EPA has prepared the pamphlet. See
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 747-K-94-001, PROTECT YOUR FAMILY
FROM LEAD IN YOUR HOME (1997).
93. The statement required on sales contracts is prescribed by Title X, and reads as
follows:

Every purchaser of any interest in residential real property on which a
residential dwelling was built prior to 1978 is notified that such property may
present exposure to lead from lead-based paint that may place young children
at risk of developing lead poisoning. Lead poisoning in young children may
produce permanent neurological damage, including -learning disabilities, reduced intelligence quotient, behavioral problems, and impaired memory. Lead
poisoning also poses a particular risk to pregnant women. The seller of any
interest in residential real property is required to provide the buyer with any
information on lead-based paint hazards from risk assessments or inspections
in the seller's possession and -notify the buyer of any known lead-based paint
hazards. A risk assessment or inspection for possible lead-based paint hazards
is recommended prior to purchase.
42 U.S.C. § 4852d(a)(3) (1994).
The requirement for rental contracts is contained in implementing regulations. EPA
and HUD have modified the statutory language to make it easier to understand. The
required language is the following:
Housing built before 1978 may contain lead-based paint. Lead from paint,
paint chips, and dust can pose health hazards if not managed properly. Lead
exposure is especially harmful to young children and pregnant women. Before
renting pre-1978 housing, lessors must disclose the presence of lead-based
paint andlor lead-based paint hazards in the dwelling. Lessees must also
receive a federally approved pamphlet on lead poisoning prevention..
40 C.ER. § 745.1l3(b)(I) (1996).
94. See 24 C.ER. § 35.82(b) (1996); 40 C.ER. § 745.101(b) (1996). A certified
inspector must make the determination that a unit is free of lead-based paint. See id.
"Lead-based paint free" means free of paint with lead levels above those provided in Title
X, i.e., "free of paint or other surface coatings that contain lead equal to or in excess of
1.0 milligram per square centimeter or 0.5 percent by weight." 24 C.ER. § 35.86 (1996);
40 C.ER. § 745.103 (1996).
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tion for presence of lead-based hazards prior to sale. 9s These disclosure requirements went into effect in late 1996.96
Another important regulatory development is found in the underwriting standards of the Federal National Mortgage Association
("Fannie Mae") and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
("Freddie Mac"), the nation's two largest secondary mortgage lenders. In 1991, Fannie Mae amended its property appraisal standards
for multi-family dwellings to incorporate concerns about lead-based
paint hazards. 97 If the property was built before 1978 and does not
have a valid certificate of compliance with applicable state or local
lead-based paint laws, physical testing of the property is required. 98
Where lead-based paint is found on the property, Fannie Mae will
only purchase the mortgage if remedial action is taken by the
borrower to promptly bring the property into compliance with environmental standards. 99 Freddie Mac likewise requires that leadbased paint hazards be evaluated as part of the loan commitment
process for multi-family dwellings, and that where such hazards
are identified, the borrower agree to address them through an ongoing operations and maintenance plan. loo
The Title X disclosure obligations and secondary mortgage
market underwriting standards will create market pressures for
some property owners to voluntarily evaluate and control leadbased paint hazards in order to gain a marketing advantage for their
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(a)(I)(C) (1994).
96. See 24 C.F.R. § 35.84 (1996); 40 C.F.R. § 745.102 (1996). Specifically, they
became effective on September 6, 1996, for owners of more than four residential
dwellings, and on December 6, 1996, for owners of four or fewer residential dwellings.
See 24 C.F.R. § 35.84; 40 C.F.R. § 745.102.
97. See FEDERAL NAT'L MORTGAGE ASS'N, UPDATE TO MULTIFAMILY DELEGATED
UNDERWRITING AND SERVICING GUIDE § 101 (1994).
98. See id. at Exhibit X-I-13.
99. See id. § 101.04. The Fannie Mae guide lists as an unacceptable environmental
condition the "[p]resence of lead based paint on site that is in violation of applicable rules,
laws, and regulations; or that cannot be abated and/or managed in a reasonable manner in
order to prevent exposure to sensitive populations." [d. Lead in soil on the property in
concentrations greater than 100 parts per million (ppm) and lead in groundwater under the
property in concentrations greater than .05 ppm are also considered unacceptable. See id.
Remedial actions to correct these conditions must be completed within 90 days after loan
delivery. See id. § 101.05. If lead-based paint is present on the property but currently does
not pose a hazard, Fannie Mae requires an operations and maintenance plan. See id.
§ 101.06, Exhibit X-I-14. Fannie Mae's appraisal requirements for single family homes
are weaker; they mandate that the appraiser address in a comment section "adverse
environmental conditions:' without specifically naming lead-based paint as one of these
conditions. See id.; see also Schukoske, Evolving Paradigm, sllpra note 72, at 553.
100. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, sllpra note 1, at 101.
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properties or to more easily obtain financing and insurance. However, these market forces will be far less effective with owners of
economically distressed housing, who cannot afford the costs of
lead hazard controls and do not have insurance.I°1 The disclosure
obligations also may have other unintended consequences, such as
prompting landlords to refuse to rent to families with children due
to fears about possible liability, or causing lending institutions to
"lead-line" (refuse to provide loans to) neighborhoods with high
concentrations of older housing.

B. California State Law
1. Lead-Specific Statutes
As in the great majority of states, the focus of lead-specific
California law is on testing children and ensuring appropriate intervention in cases of lead poisoning, not on remedying lead-based
paint hazards in housing. State law also imposes some important
disclosure requirements on property owners.
The California Department of Health Services ("DHS") is required to establish a statewide standard of medical care by which
health care providers will evaluate all children under age six for
the risk of lead poisoning and test the blood lead levels of children
found to be at risk of lead poisoning. 102 Widespread testing of
children for lead in California began in 1992 as the result of a
successful lawsuit against DHS by advocacy groups.103 State law
also requires DHS to study the extent and causes of childhood lead
poisoning, identify and conduct medical follow-up of high-risk
children, ensure case management of children found to be lead-poi101. See FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 71, at 9-10, 29-30.
102. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 105285 (West 1996).
103. See Matthews v. Coye, No. C-90-3620 EFL (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1991) (unpublished settlement agreement, on file with author). DHS agreed as part of this settlement
to expand the California Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program. See id. at 2. Child
health care providers are required to screen children aged six months to six years who are
eligible for the state's publicly funded well-child program, the Child Health & Disability
Prevention ("CHDP") program (which covers children who live at or below 200% of the
poverty level). See id. at 3. In addition, health insurance poliCies and service plans are
mandated to cover screening of children at risk for lead poisoning. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1367.3-.5 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); CAL. INs. CODE § 10123.5 (West
1993).
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soned, and "take steps that it determines are necessary to reduce
the incidence of excessive childhood lead exposure in California." 104 DHS is also required to adopt regulations setting forth
standards for the abatement of lead paint in housing;105 these standards will probably be issued in 1997.106 Other state laws concern
training and certification requirements for contractors and others
removing lead-based paint,107 occupational lead exposure,108 and a
pilot school project. 109
California real estate law requires sellers to provide buyers with
a real estate transfer disclosure statement prior to the transfer of any
real property.110 Sellers are required to disclose any known environmental hazards, which include lead-based paint on the property.ll1
104. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 105290, 124125, 124160, 124165 (West
1996).

105. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124160(b) (West 1996).
106. See Telephone Interview with Dr. Susan Cummins, Acting Branch Chief,
Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch, Cal. Dep't of Health Servs. (Mar. 5, 1997).
The 1991 Act authorized DHS to collect up to $16 million per year to support its
Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program through fees on industries that have
historically contributed or are currently contributing to environmental lead contamination.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 372.7 (West Supp. 1997). The formula developed
by DHS to implement this provision imposed fees largely on the petroleum and paint
industries. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 33010, 33020, 33030 (1997). Most of the fees
collected by DHS (approximately $12 million annually) were distributed to county agencies to support their lead poisoning prevention programs. See Childhood Lead Poisoning
Prevention Branch, Cal. Dep't of Health Services, Budget Augmentation: Childhood Lead
Poisoning Prevention, Fiscal Year 1993-1994 at 21 (unpublished report, on file with
author). However, these fees were subsequently invalidated as an unconstitutional tax. See
Sinclair Paint Co. v. Board of Equalization, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572 (Ct. App. 1996), review
granted, 920 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1996).
107. DHS, in consultation with the California Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("Cal/OSHA"), is required to develop certification and training requirements for contractors and construction workers doing lead-related work in order to meet
the requirements of Title X. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY ,CODE § 429.16 (West Supp.
1997); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 6716-6717 (West Supp. 1997). Emergency regulations governing the accreditation of training providers and certification of individuals engaged in
lead-related construction work were issued by DHS in June 1994, see CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 17, §§ 35001-35099 (1995), but compliance with the regulations is currently voluntary.
lOS. Cal/OSHA has adopted a lead-in-construction standard that protects construction workers doing lead-related work by requiring that respiratory equipment and training
be provided unless the employer can demonstrate that the worker will not be exposed to
hazardous levels of lead. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 1532.1 (1995). State law also
requires DHS to establish an occupational lead poisoning registry to monitor adult cases
of lead toxicity, and to investigate cases of occupational take-home exposure. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 429.13-.15 (West Supp. 1997).
109. DHS has begun a pilot study of public elementary schools and public day care
facilities in order to predict the incidence of lead contamination and recommend means
of testing and remediation. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 32240-32245 (West 1994).
110. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (West Supp. 1997).
111. See id. As required by state law, DHS has prepared a consumer informational
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This requirement is far less extensive than the Title X disclosure
rule, however.l12 Some local jurisdictions in California impose additional disclosure requirements for properties where a lead-poisoned
child has been found. l13
Thus, while California state law requires testing of children at
risk, authorizes medical management of poisoned children, and
provides for limited disclosure to purchasers of property, it does
not mandate that property owners evaluate or control lead hazards,
or take proactive measures to prevent lead poisoning from occurring. I 14

2. Other State Statutes
A number of generally applicable California statutes and common law doctrines impose obligations that pertain to hazards caused
by lead-based paint. Because many of these requirements are premised on the traditional housing paradigm,115 however, they also do
not expressly require property owners to investigate for and control
lead-based paint hazards.

a. The Warranty of Habitability
In California, an implied warranty of habitability exists in
every residential rental agreement. 116 This doctrine provides that
the landlord is deemed to warrant that the property is, and will be,
repaired and maintained in a condition that meets certain minimum
booklet on common environmental hazards affecting real property, including lead-based
paint hazards. DHS is required to update this booklet to comply with the disclosure
requirements of Title X. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25417.1 (West Supp. 1997).
112. See discussion supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
113. Under San Francisco's lead ordinance, for example, if a county building
inspection of a dwelling in which a lead-poisoned child has been found shows elevated
concentrations of lead paint (lead in the paint in concentrations equal to or greater than
5000 parts per million (ppm) or lower if determined to be appropriate), the building owner
must notify all building occupants of the test results. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HEALTH
CODE art. 26, § 1626(c), amended by SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE 407-96 (1996).
114. California's "secondary prevention" approach, rather than a "primary prevention" approach that removes lead from housing before children are exposed, is consistent
with the existing law in most states. See Mahoney, supra note 70, at 54-55; see also infra
Part V (describing approaches taken by other states).
115. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974); Hinson v. Delis,
102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665-66 (Ct. App. 1972).
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standards of habitability. Failure to meet those minimum standards
constitutes a breach by the landlord of the implied warranty.117
The California Civil Code .lists specific conditions that must
be maintained in order for a dwelling to be considered habitable. liS
Lead hazards are not listed among these conditions, but the list is
not exclusive; the basic issue is the habitability of the premises. 1I9
Other states have extended the warranty of habitability to include
uncontrolled lead hazards. 120 Given the serious health threat posed
by uncontrolled lead hazards, California courts will likely follow
suit.
Tenants can demand that landlords repair any problems that
make an apartment uninhabitable, and, if a landlord fails to do so,
can exercise the "repair and deduct" option provided by state law,
making the repairs themselves and deducting the expenses from
their rent.121 This remedy, however, is of little use to tenants in the
context of lead-based paint hazards, for several reasons. In the
absence of routine testing by local housing agencies for lead-based
paint, tenants will rarely be able to prove both the presence of a
lead-based hazard in their properties and also notice to the lessor
of that hazard. 122 In addition, the California statute limits repairs
to the cost of one month's rent, an amount insufficient to address
most lead hazards. 123 Finally, properly controlling lead-based paint
hazards requires specialized training that tenants rarely possess.
h. State Housing Law

Under California's Housing Law, housing units that fail to
meet minimum specified standards, units in which a nuisance exists, and units that endanger the health and safety of occupants are
117. See Green, 517 P.2d at 1182-83.
118. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1 (West 1995).
119. See Green, 517 P.2d at 1182-83.
120. See Housing Auth. v. Olesen, 624 A.2d 920 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (holding
that the presence of lead-based paint rendered property uninhabitable regardless of the
knowledge of the landlord); Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658, 667 (Mass. 1991)
(listing peeling lead paint as condition contributing to finding that apartment was uninhabitable).
121. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West 1995).
122. See Jane Schukoske, Lead Paint and the Warranty of Habitability in Pre-1950
Rental Housing: Maryland's Lead Poisoning Prevention Program Creates a PreslImption
of Presence of Lead Paint, 4 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 22, 50 (1994) [hereinafter Schukoske,
Maryland's Lead Poisoning Prevention Program].
123. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.
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considered substandard. 124 Lead hazards are not specifically listed
in the statute as an element of substandard housing. As discussed
below,l25 however, a strong argument can be made that units in
which lead hazards are found are substandard because they constitute a nuisance.
Local housing departments and other enforcement agencies
can issue corrective orders and seek criminal penalties against
substandard housing. 126 However, for a variety of reasons, enforcement of housing code law is unlikely to trigger substantial lead
hazard controL 127 As Professor Schukoske notes, testing for the
presence of lead-based paint is not part of regular housing inspections because of shortages of staff; because local enforcing agencies are overburdened and rarely refer recalcitrant landlords for
prosecution; and because agencies are sympathetic to arguments
that enforcing abatement rules will lead to the abandonment of
housing stock. 128 Private parties cannot sue directly to enforce California's Housing Law, but they can use violations of the statute as
the basis for bringing suit under the state's consumer protection
law, the Unfair Competition Act. 129
c. Nuisance

By statute, California has broadly defined a nuisance to be
"[anything] which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property." 130 A substandard housing condition that endangers a tenant's health is considered a nuisance. 131 Courts would be likely to
124. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17920.3 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996).
125. See infra Part III.B.2.c.
126. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 17961, 17980, 17995 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1996).
127. See Schukoske, Evolving Paradigm, supra note 72, at 529.
128. See id.
129. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996). This statute
makes it unlawful for businesses to engage in any unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent business
act or practice. Unlawful acts are broadly defined to include violation of essentially any
law, including local, county or state housing or building codes. A single code violation
may be sufficient to constitute an unlawful business practice. See id.
130. CAL. C1V. CODE § 3479 (West 1970). Any person whose property has been
injured or whose enjoyment of property is interfered with by a nuisance may bring suit
to abate the nuisance. See CAL. Crv. PRoe. CODE § 731 (West 1980).
131. See Smith v. David, 176 Cal. Rptr. 112, 119 (Ct. App. 1981).
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find that deteriorating lead-based paint in an apartment, particularly one occupied by young children, interferes with the tenant's
use and enjoyment of the property and constitutes a nuisance. This
remedy, however, is not likely to be effective in the absence of a
definitively identified lead hazard in a dwelling unit, and certainly
will not work to effectuate widespread preventative measures by
property owners.
d. Proposition 65

Under California's Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Water
and' Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986,132 private businesses must
provide "clear and reasonable warnings" prior to "knowingly and
intentionally" exposing individuals to chemicals, including lead,
known to the state to cause reproductive toxicity.133 Thus, landlords, contractors, and other parties may be required to provide
Proposition 65 warnings to tenants, workers, or other individuals
exposed to lead from deteriorating paint or paint disturbed during
construction or renovation activities.
Warnings are required unless the party causing the exposurel 34
can demonstrate that the exposure is below the statutory warning
level. 135 For lead, this level is quite stringent, meaning that exposure to very small amounts of lead dust or lead-contaminated soil
will require a warning. 136 The defendant must "knowingly" and
"intentionally" expose the plaintiff for a warning to be required.
"Knowingly" means with knowledge that the exposure is occurring
and that lead is a chemical listed as a reproductive toxin under the
statute; knowledge that the exposure is illegal is not required. 137 A
defendant's knowledge that an exposure is occurring will depend
on the age and condition of the housing unit, the defendant's
132. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5-.13 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
133. [d. Lead has been listed as a chemical known to the State of California to cause
reproductive harm as well as cancer. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12000 (1996).
134. The term "expose" as used in Proposition 65 means "to cause to ingest, inhale,
contact via body surfaces or otherwise come into contact with a chemica1." CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 22, § 12201(f) (1996).
135. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
For reproductive toxins like lead, exposures must be less than 1I1000th of the No
Observable Effect Level ("NOEL"). See id.
136. See id. Regulations provide that exposures less than 0.5 micrograms per day
do not require a warning. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12805(b) (1993).
137. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12301(d) (1993).
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awareness of lead-based paint in housing, and other factors.138 "Intentionally" is not defined by regulation, but is likely to be interpreted as intent to commit an act that results in exposure.139 Warnings provided under Proposition 65 must be "clear and reasonable,"140
although neither the statute nor its implementing regulations prescribe any specific form of warning.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that few, if any, Proposition 65
warnings have been provided for exposures to lead-based paint in
housing. Proposition 65 is a particularly attractive statute for plain-,
tiffs since it does not require proof of any harm to the plaintiff,
places the burden of proving that an exposure is exempt from the
statute on the defendant,141 and provides that private parties can
recover twenty-five percent of the penalties awarded for violation
of the statute. 142 Although there are factors that limit the number
of future cases likely to be filed based on noncompliance with this
statute,143 it remains an area of significant potential liability for
property owners and other parties. l44 On the other hand, since the
only preventative measure required by this law is the provision of
warnings to exposed individuals, greater reliance on the statute is
unlikely to stimulate large-scale control activities.

138. See infra notes 156-160 and accompanying text (regarding the knowledge
element in common law tort actions).
139. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under
California's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303,308 (1996).
140. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
141. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
142. See id. § 25192.
143. One such factor is that Proposition 65 only applies to businesses with 10 or
more employees, thus excluding many property owners. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25249.11(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997). Another is that government agencies do
not routinely test housing for lead-based paint, so many tenants are unaware that they are
being exposed to lead. See supra text accompanying note 128. Finally, if owners comply
with Title X's notification scheme, they will be providing tenants with some notice about
the possible risks of lead-based paint. Even though this notice would not be equivalent to
the "clear and reasonable" warning required by Proposition 65 (primarily because it
discusses the risks of lead poisoning in general and does not inform recipients that they
are being exposed to lead in a particular housing unit), it would likely mitigate any penalty
awarded for failure to comply with Proposition 65.
144. In the absence of widespread efforts to control lead-based paint hazards,
tenants and their children are likely to continue to be exposed to lead at 'levels requiring
Proposition 65 warnings. As public awareness about lead poisoning increases, particularly
with the implementation of Title X's notification requirements, it will become easier to
establish that property owners have knowledge that exposure to lead from deteriorating
paint is occurring.
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e. Summary

Landlord-tenant law, state housing law, and Proposition 65 all
provide potential avenues for addressing lead-based paint hazards
in housing and may be useful in individual cases. Under Proposition 65 in particular, the liability of noncomplying property owners
can be considerable. However, none of these statutes directly addresses the problem of lead-based paint hazards or mandates lead
hazard controls, and none is preventative. Nor is any of these
statutes likely to trigger widespread reductions in lead-based paint
hazards. In the absence of widespread testing for lead-based paint
hazards, private enforcement remains difficult. Often, both owners
and occupiers are unaware of the risks a property poses until a case
of lead poisoning has been diagnosed.
3. Common Law Recovery for Lead-Poisoned Children
a. Standards under California Law

Nationally, childhood lead poisonings have spawned thousands
of tort actions for damages by parents of poisoned children. 145 Most
commonly, actions are filed by tenants against owners of rental
property, but more recently, claims also have been brought successfully against property management companies, public housing authorities, cities, lenders, realtors, property appraisers, child care facilities, and contractors. 146 Within the past five years, at least ten of
these actions have resulted in verdicts of over $1 million for injured children. 147 California thus far has been largely spared the
litigation explosion of other states, but that is starting to change. 148
145. See Craig Brown, Lead Paint: The Next Asbestos?, S.F. RECORDER ENVTL. L.
SUPPLEMENT, Autumn 1996, at 15. An estimated 6000 lead-poisoning cases were filed in
New York alone in the mid-1990s. See id.
146. See The Report Charts Five Years of Trials: Results Mixed,S Mealey's Litig. Rep.:
Lead (Mealey) No.5, at 10-32 (Dec. 1, 1995); see also Sarah Coyne, Lead Paint Abatement:
Who Should Pay?, 2 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 113, 134-35 (1995) (noting that lawsuits have been
filed against a growing number of parties, including real estate agents, property managers,
and property appraisers); Schukoske, Evolving Paradigm, supra note 72, at 522-23.
147. See Verdicts in Lead-Poisoning Cases in the 1990s, 5 Mealey's Litig. Rep.:
Lead (Mealey) No. 17, at 29 (June 5, 1996) [hereinafter 1990s Verdicts] (reporting that,
of 54 contested trials in lead poisoning cases resolved from late 1991 to mid-1996, over
half resulted in awards to plaintiffs of at least $100,000).
148. See infra text accompanying notes 180-181.
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This section outlines the state of tort law relevant to lead poisoning
claims in California. 149
Until recently, California law provided that residential landlords could be strictly liable in tort for injuries to tenants caused
by a latent defect in the leased premises. 150 In Peterson v. Superior
Court,151 the California Supreme Court altered that rule, concluding
that strict liability imposed an undue burden on landlords to discover and correct defects that would not be disclosed by a reasonable inspection, and therefore forced them to be insurers of the
safety of their tenants. 152 The Peterson decision follows the rule in
the majority of jurisdictions. 153
Landlords (and other parties) may still be liable in negligence,
however, for injuries resulting from defects in their premises,154
including injuries to children from lead-based paint hazards. Plaintiffs pursuing such actions must establish that (1) the defendant
had knowledge of a lead hazard in the child's dwelling; (2) the
defendant owed a duty of care to protect the tenant's child from
lead-based paint hazards; and (3) there was causation, i.e., the
defendant's breach of duty was the proximate cause of damage to
the plaintiff. 155 The knowledge element requires proof that the land149. To date, there are no appellate decisions in California involving claims for
damages to lead- poisoned children. For a general discussion of cases involving lead
poisoning suits against landlords, see Daniel LeVan, Landlord Liability for Lead Poisoning
of Tenant Children Caused by Defects in the Premises, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 429
(1993).
150. See Becker v. lRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 120-24 (Cal. 1985) (extending the
general rule imposing strict liability for personal injury caused by a defective product
placed in the stream of commerce that was established in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod.,
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963».
151. 899 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1995).
152. See id. at 912. The only. exceptions are where the landlord participated in the
construction of the building or otherwise created the defective condition causing the injury.
See id. at 914. The court found that the rationales underlying strict liability do not apply
to landlords, who often cannot exert pressure upon the manufacturer to make the product
safe and have no continuing business relationship with the manufacturer of the defective
product. See id. at 913. Tenants do have an expectation of safety based on the implied
warranty of habitability contained in a residential lease. However, the expectation is that
the landlord has inspected the rental unit and corrected any defects disclosed by the
inspection, not that the landlord will have eliminated defects of which she is unaware and
that would not have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection. See id. at 917-18.
153. See id. at 909-10.
154. See id. at 906.
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965) (setting forth principles
governing liability of landlord for injuries to a tenant caused by dangerous conditions of
the premises); see also Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 645 A.2d 1147, 1151 (Md.
1994) ("In order to establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiffs must prove
the following elements: (1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff
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lord or owner knew about or could have reasonably discovered the
lead hazard in the child's dwelling, and that he also knew, or had
reason to know, that the lead hazards could injure the child. ls6 In
the past, courts have held that knowledge of flaking paint in an
apartment, by itself, does not constitute notice of a lead hazard, in
part because the dangers of lead-based paint are not so widely
recognized that landlords should know that a lead hazard exists in
their housing unitS.IS7 In at least one recent case, however, a court
found that a property manager and landlord had "reason to know"
about lead hazards where they were aware of peeling paint, and
knew the building was old and that older buildings often contained
lead-based paint. 1SS As Title X's notice and disclosure requirements
are implemented,ls9 courts will be more likely to find that property
owners know or have reason to know about the risks of lead-based
paint in pre-1978 housing, making proof of notice much less problematic. 160
from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual
injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's
breach of the duty.").
156. See Brown v. Marathon Realty, Inc., 565 N.Y.S.2d 219 (App. Div. 1991); see
also Winston Properties v. Sanders, 565 N.E.2d 1280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding
landlord not liable despite notification by tenant of peeling paint and cracked plaster where
landlord had no knowledge of the danger posed by paint).
157. See Winston, 565 N.E.2d at 1281; see also Hayes v. Hambruch, 841 F. Supp.
706,710-12 (D. Md. 1994) (noting that the lead poisoning had occurred in the mid-1970s.
when lead poisoning was not a well-known problem, and that a different case might be
presented if plaintiffs could show that the potential for lead poisoning was a danger that
landlords in general should have recognized), aff'd 64 F.3d 657 (4th Cir. 1995). Some
courts have required actual knowledge of the presence of lead-based paint. See, e.g.,
Underwood v. Risman, 605 N.E.2d 832, 840 (Mass. 1993) (rejecting constructive knowledge test and holding that landlord could not be held liable for failure to disclose because
he did not have actual knowledge of presence of lead-based paint); Felton v. Spratley, 640
A.2d 1358. 1360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (finding that defendants were not obligated to
correct peeling or chipping paint of which they had no knowledge). For a discussion of
the cases in this area, see Thomas Miceli et aI., Protecting Children From Lead-Based
Paint Poisoning: Should Landlords Bear the Burden?, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. I,
21-25, 33-35 (1995).
158. See Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 645 A.2d 1147 (Md. 1994); see also
Juarez v. Wavecrest Management Team, 627 N.E.2d 135, 139 (N.Y. 1996) (interpreting
New York City ordinance that requires property owners to abate paint containing specified
hazardous levels of lead in any apartment unit in which a child six years old or younger
resides and that establishes a presumption that peeling interior paint in any dwelling built
before 1960 in which a child of that age lives constitutes a hazardous condition, and
holding that landlords who have knowledge that such a unit is occupied by a child of the
specified age are deemed to have constructive notice of the hazardous lead condition).
159. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
160. Also, the hazards of lead-based paint are becoming increasingly well known.
See Miceli et aI., supra note 157, at 24.
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There are no specific legal standards of care relevant to leadbased paint hazards, established either by statute or case law, for
property owners in California. 161 In general, courts have held that
children are owed a greater degree of care than adults because they
lack the capacity to appreciate risks and to avoid danger,162 and that
this special duty extends to landlords who rent to families with
children. 163 Landlords also have a general duty to disclose the existence of hidden defects that they know about or have reason to knowabout, and are not apparent to the tenant; 164 these defects may
include lead-based paint hazards. 165 Moreover, landlords may be
found negligent based on their noncompliance with the implied
warranty of habitability under state law,166 the state housing law, 167
local ordinances,168 or under other theories. Unfortunately, the absence of clearly established standards for controlling lead hazards
161. Nationally, there are no clear standards of care for lead hazard control in
private rental housing. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 45.
162. See McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Cp., 269 Cal. Rptr. 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1990);
Casas v. Maulhardt Buick, Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (Ct. App. 1968).
163. See Copfer v. Golden, 288 P.2d 90, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
164. See Merrill v. Buck, 375 P.2d 304, 307 (Cal. 1962); Shotwell v. Bloom, 140
P.2d 728, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943).
165. See LeVan, supra note 149, at 438-40; see also Miceli et aI., supra note 157,
at 20-25.
166. See Becker v. JRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 116 (Cal. 1985); see also supra Part
IIl.B.2.a (discussing the warranty of habitability in more detail). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.6 (1976). For example, the warranty of habitability
imposes a duty on landlords to inspect rental dwellings reasonably. See Peterson v.
Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905, 916 (Cal. 1995) (quoting Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d
168 (Cal. 1974)); see also Miceli et aI., supra note 157, at 29-30. A landlord also has a
duty to repair promptly defects of which he knows or should know. See Peterson, 899 P.2d
at 916 (quoting Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1974». There is also a duty
to keep common areas in repair and in reasonable condition. See id.; see also Norwood v.
Lazarus, 634 S.W.2d 584, 586-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding landlord liable for injuries
suffered by child from peeling paint in hallway and back and front porches); LeVan, supra
note 149, at 440-41 (noting that a landlord's failure to control identified lead hazards of
which she had notice would likely constitute a breach of the warranty of habitability).
167. See supra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
168. For example, property owners in Los Angeles County who fail to control
deteriorating lead-based paint could be found negligent based on their noncompliance with
the county ordinance prohibiting any person from permitting "dangerous levels of lead"
to remain on the interior or exterior surfaces of any dwelling. See infra notes 195-197
and accompanying text; see also Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 645 A.2d 1147,
1149 (Md. 1994) (finding that a landlord's duty to protect plaintiffs from injury emanates
from Baltimore City Code, which requires that "[a]ll walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors and
windows shall be kept clean and free of any flaking, loose or peeling paint and paper:'
and states that "no paint shall be used for interior painting of any dwelling ... unless it
is free from any lead pigment"); Hardy v. Griffin, 569 A.2d 49, 51 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989)
(holding landlord strictly liable for violation of local ordinance requiring landlords to
maintain rental property free of lead).
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in private housing once these hazards have been identified means that
property owners lack certainty that any control measures they implement will satisfy their common law duty of care. Without this certainty, owners are unlikely to implement control measures, and the
tort system will be ineffective in reducing lead-based paint hazards.
Causation in fact is the hardest element to prove in lead poisoning cases because lead poisoning is not a "signature" disease, and
many of its symptoms can also result from other illnesses, environmental factors, or even heredity.169 Likewise, it may be difficult to
prove that the cause of a child's lead poisoning is the defendant's
lead-based paint, as opposed to other sources of lead exposure.1 70
Establishing proximate causation should be less of a hurdle given
the known propensity of children to put things into their mouths
and the growing awareness of the causes of lead poisoning. 171
California is now experiencing the initial stages of what is
likely to become a major surge in tort actions.172 Within the past
two years, over a half dozen cases have settled or resulted in
verdicts awarding substantial damages to the plaintiffs. 173 These
include recoveries against landlords who failed to repair deteriorating paint,174 failed to abate a known lead hazard after being
169. See Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 192-93 (D. Mass.
1992), aff'd 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993).
170. See id. at 193.
171. See McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1990)
(finding that scope of foreseeable risks to children must include tendency of children to
get into things); see also Nonvood, 634 S.W.2d at 586-87 (finding it reasonably foreseeable that tenant's child would play in the hall where there was deteriorating lead-based
paint and that young children "have a proclivity to put anything they can get into their
hands into their mouths"); LeVan, supra note 149, at 436-37 ("[T]he foreseeability of a
child eating lead-based paint chippings is no longer a point of contention in today's
published cases apparently because the dangers of lead-based paint to children are now
commonly known.").
172. See infra text accompanying note 180.
173. This information is based on a summary of cases prepared by Lead Safe
California. See Lead Safe California, California Lead Cases Reported to Lead Safe
California 1 (May 31, 1996) (unpublished report, on file with author). Other cases that
have settled are subject to confidentiality agreements. See id.
174. See id. (reporting Morales v. Quan, No. KC103694 (L.A. County Super. ct.
1995), in which jury found landlord strictly liable and negligent for his failure to inspect
propeity for lead-based paint hazards, and awarded damages of $150,000 to child; jury
verdict was vacated by trial judge, and case settled for undisclosed amount; verdict waS
rendered prior to California Supreme Court's decision in Peterson, 899 P.2d 905 (Cal.
1995) (eliminating strict liability»; see also $150,000 for Plaintiff in California Lead
Trial, 4 Mealey's Litig Rep.: Lead (Mealey) No.9, at 3 (Feb. 1, 1995) (reporting Morales
v. Quan); Vicki Torres, $150,000 Awarded in Case of Lead Poisoning, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
27, 1995, at Bl (reporting award to plaintiff Morales).
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ordered to do SO,175 hired unqualified painting contractors 176 and
improperly attempted to abate lead hazards on their own,177 and
against contractors who used unsafe work practices while painting
the exterior of a home. 178
While still tiny in number compared to the caseload in Northeastern states, largely because California only very recently began
widespread blood screening of children,179 the number of lead poisoning cases in California is certain to increase. 180 As more children
are tested for lead, increasing numbers will be diagnosed with lead
poisoning. 181 If current testing results remain constant, over 14,000
children in the state will be found to have seriously elevated blood
levels (over 25 %g/dL).182 Public awareness of the risks of leadbased paint will increase significantly as Title X's notice and disclosure requirements become effective, requiring notification to
tenants and purchasers in all pre-1978 housing units, which comprise over seventy-five percent of the state's housing. 183 Moreover,
175. See Lead Safe California, supra note 173, at 1 (reporting Galvez v. Huerta, No.
BC 127259 (L.A. County Super. Ct. 1995), which resulted in settlement of $100,000 from
landlord for three children identified as lead-poisoned).
.
176. See id. (reporting Broadway v. Correa, No. 739271-7 (Alameda County Super.
Ct. 1995), involving a finding by arbitrator that property owner had used his neighbors,
unqualified and unlicensed contractors, to paint home's exterior, thus creating "a dangerous
condition on the property in question"; case settled for $110,000).
177. See id. (reporting Chavez v. Ortega, No. VC015993 (L.A. County Super. Ct.
1996), in which inspection by county health department of apartment of lead-poisoned
child discovered lead-based paint hazards; landlord subsequently tried to abate lead
hazards himself, using unsafe work practices that caused child's blood lead levels to
increase again; arbitrator awarded the child $90,000 in damages for future counseling and
psychotherapy costs and $12,841 in damages for past medical expenses).
178. See id. (reporting Quarterman v. Caldarelli, No. 947361 (S.F. County Super.
Ct. 1995), suit brought by defendant landowner's neighbor in which jury awarded
$145,000 in damages, finding landlord to be 30% liable and contractor 70% liable in
nuisance and trespass after contractor hired by property owner used unsafe work practices
while painting home).
179. See supra text accompanying note 103.
180. See Richard Fogel, Litigation and Lead Paint Claims, 42 RISK MGMT. 38
(1995) (noting that lead-based paint lawsuits by tenants against landlords are increasing
due to increased awareness by public and plaintiffs' bar).
181. See id. at 38 (noting that increased testing is likely to give rise to new
lawsuits).
182. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. Moreover, this is a "snapshot"
figure, reflecting the number of poisoned children at a given point in time when testing
occurs. Over time, as more children are exposed to lead-based paint, the total number of
poisoned children will increase, although the increase will not necessarily be reflected in
any "snapshot" measurement. See Telephone Interview with Robert Schlag, Chief, Surveillance and Envtl. Studies Section, Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch, Cal. Dep't
of Health Servs. (Apr. 30, 1996).
183. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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injured plaintiffs are likely to follow the precedent in other jurisdictions and seek to cast the net of liability widely, suing property
management companies, public housing authorities, cities, lenders,
realtors, property appraisers, child care facilities, and contractors. 184
h. The Efficacy of Tort Actions in Remedying Lead-Based
Paint Hazards

As the Title X Task Force emphasized, tort liability serves
both compensatory and deterrent functions. 185 Tort damage suits
can provide redress to lead-poisoned children. Fear of liability can
stimulate property ow~ers to take prophylactic measures to control
lead hazards. But tort litigation cannot provide a systemic solution
to the problem of childhood lead poisoning.
Tort litigation will provide compensation for only a very small
percentage of injured children. 186 Because of the asymptomatic nature of lead poisoning, many families are unaware that their children are lead-poisoned. Other families are unaware of their legal
rights or are reluctant to consult lawyers. Tenants may also forego
litigation because of fear of landlord retaliation or of losing low
rent housing. ls7 Harsh legal economics will discourage private attorneys from taking many cases, particularly those involving indigent families. ISS As detailed above, proving the elements of a negligence claim, particularly causation, can be quite difficult. 189 Owners
of some of the worst housing are judgment proof or have no
insurance. Suits against deep-pocket lead paint manufacturers have
been unsuccessful to date. 190
184. See Coyne, supra note 146, at 135-36 (noting that lawsuits have been filed
against growing number of parties, including real estate agents, property managers, and
property appraisers); see also Schukoske, Maryland's Lead Poisoning Prevention Program,
supra note 122, at 43 n.83 (noting that recent criminal prosecutions under Maryland
environmental statutes target violations by private lead hazard abatement contractors rather
than property owners).
185. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 110.
186. See id. at 111.
187. See Mahoney, supra note 70, at 58-60.
188. See id. at 58-59. Attorneys will be discouraged because of the uncertainty that
damages will be awarded and the low projected earnings of poor plaintiffs. See id.
189. See supra notes 154-171 and accompanying text.
190. Cases have been brought against paint manufacturers under numerous theories
with little success, due not only to plaintiffs' inability to prove causation, but also in large
part to their inability to pinpoint a wrongdoer. Theories of liability that have failed thus
far include the market share theory, the concert of action theory, the enterprise liability

1997]

The Lead Poisoning Challenge

417

Case law in tort actions can establish a legal standard of care
for property owners. But litigation is lengthy, expensive, and unpredictable. Courts lack the expertise to prescribe specific rules in
an area as highly technical and complex as managing and controlling lead hazards. Thus far, the tort system has failed to provide
clear standards of hazard control for rental property owners. 191
Moreover, reliance on tort litigation will result in highly uneven
and incomplete compliance by property owners.l92 The threat of
liability apparently has not motivated many owners, particularly
those without insurance, to control lead hazards, especially in the
absence of clear standards. 193
C. Local and Municipal Law in California
A number of local jurisdictions in California, including San
Francisco, Los Angeles, Pasadena, and Long Beach, have adopted
their own lead ordinances. Other municipalities, including San Diego, are considering such measures, and this trend is likely to
continue as public awareness about childhood lead poisoning grows.
Like state law, these local ordinances emphasize responding to
identified cases of lead-poisoned children, although some cities,
notably San Francisco, also have begun to consider measures that
require lead hazard evaluation and controls in all pre-1978 rental
housing. 194 The scope and stringency of existing laws varies considerably from one locality to another.

theory, and the theory of res ipsa loquitur. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n,
994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting theories of market share, enterprise liability, and
res ipsa loquitur due to plaintiff's inability to prove causation); Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 794 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1992), aff'd 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993) (rejecting
concert of action and enterprise liability theories); Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782
F. Supp. 186 (D. Mass. 1992), aff'd 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993) (rejecting market share
theory). But see New York v. Lead Ass'n, 597 N.Y.S.2d 698 (App. Div. 1993) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss causes of action based on fraud, restitution, civil conspiracy,
and concert of action).
191. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note I, at 111.
192. See Schukoske, Evolving Paradigm, supra note 72, at 560-61 (noting that tort
liability induces very few owners to reduce lead hazards in housing); see also Tiller, supra
note 73, at 269-70 (noting that owners weighing cost of lead controls against costs of
noncompliance will consider likelihood and size of potential damage awards against them).
193. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note I, at 45.
194. See generally San Francisco Lead Hazard Reduction Citizens Advisory Comm.,
Draft Lead Poisoning Prevention Ordinance (1996) (unpublished draft, on file with author).
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The Los Angeles County Lead Hazard Ordinance l95 illustrates the
far-reaching nature of some local enactments. The ordinance provides
that no person shall permit "readily accessible, dangerous levels of
lead-bearing substances" to remain on the interior or exterior surfaces
of "any dwelling, dwelling unit, child care facility, institution, hotel
guest room, or any premises inhabited or frequented by children."I96
This prohibition extends to such lead substances on "any toy, furniture, food utensil, or household product."197 The measure broadly
extends to owners, lessors, occupants, and other persons-even as
to hazards over which these parties have little or no control-and
applies to virtually all noncommercial buildings as well as some
commercial buildings, such as hotels, regardless of when the buildings were constructed. 198 Pasadena and Long Beach have ordinances
with similar provisions; both of those measures make violations
punishable as strict liability misdemeanor offenses. 199
Local ordinances within California differ as to what lead hazard control measures property owners must implement in response
to identified lead hazards. In both the Long Beach and Pasadena
ordinances, for example, the City Health Officer is authorized to
issue or approve interim control measures where lead hazards are
found, but only until permanent abatement measures are in place.20o
By contrast, San Francisco's statute mandates a preference for "the
least invasive, lowest-cost lead hazard remediation techniques available" that are health-protective. 201 San Francisco's statute also con-

195. Los ANGELES, CAL., COUNTY HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11.28.010-.060
(1996).
196. [d. § 11.28.010(E), .030 (1996). "Readily accessible" refers to lead "in a
peeling, flaking or chipped condition, or located on or in a substance or surface from which
it may be chewed, ingested or inhaled by children." [d. § 11.28.01O(F). Los Angeles
County has defined "dangerous levels of lead-bearing substances" to include any paint
containing lead in excess of 0.7 milligrams per square centimeter, measured by a
lead-detecting instrument, or "any substance, when measured by any scientifically accepted
method, in a quantity determined by the [County Health Department] to constitute a hazard
to children." [d. § 11.28.01O(C).
197. [d. § 11.28.01O(E).
198. See id. § 11.28.030.
199. See PASADENA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.79.040 (1995); LONG BEACH, CAL.,
MUN. CODE § 8.27.050 (1995).
200. See PASADENA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.79.050(C) (1995); LONG BEACH, CAL.,
MUN. CODE § 8.27.070(B) (1995). These statutes define abatement to include enclosure,
encapsulation, and replacement of building components. See PASADENA, CAL., MUN. CODE
§ 8.79.030(A) (1995); LONG BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.27.030(A) (1995).
201. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 26, § 1628(f), amended by SAN
FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE 407-96 (Oct. 21, 1996).
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tains a number of protections for tenants not found in other local
ordinances: it requires disclosure to all tenants when building inspections show elevated concentrations of lead paint,202 limits somewhat landlords' ability to pass the costs of lead abatement onto
tenants in the form of increased rent,203 requires landlords to pay
certain relocation costs for tenants forced to move because of
identified lead hazards,204 and provides tenants forced to relocate
with the right of reo ccup ancy, 205 as well as establishing a relocation
assistance fund from fees assessed on all residential property owners.206 San Francisco's ordinance also requires that owners of property built before 1978 provide all tenants with notification about
potential lead hazards, in addition to making the disclosures mandated by Title X.207
In short, local laws are poorly designed to address California's
lead poisoning problems. Some of the existing statutes are unduly
broad and require unnecessary abatement measures. As the number
of ordinances multiplies, the applicable rules are likely to vary
even more. and subject property owners, especially large institutional owners, to divergent standards of control.
IV.

THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION AND NEW APPROACH

California, as well as virtually every other state, needs a
new approach for dealing with the problem of lead-based paint
hazards. Like those in most other states, California's laws require controls only after children are poisoned, not preventative
steps to make housing lead safe. 208 While landlords are generally
obligated to maintain habitable dwellings, this general duty is insufficient to prompt widespread reduction of lead-based paint haz202. See id. § 1626(e).
203. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 37.3(d), amended by SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE 405-96 (Oct. 21, 1996).
204. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 72.3(B), amended by SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE 400-96 (Oct. 21, 1996).
205. See id. § 72.3(C).
206. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 73, enacted by SAN FRANCISCO,
CAL., ORDINANCE 399-96 (Oct. 21, 1996).
207. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 26, §§ 16IO(b), 1616, amended
by SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE 407-96 (Oct. 21, 1996).
208. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 50 (noting that traditional approaches to childhood lead poisoning have only reacted to lead poisoning when answer
should be prevention).
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ards. 209 Local laws likewise are not preventative. In general, California's laws reflect a housing paradigm that largely allows owners
to remain ignorant of lead conditions on their property, resulting in
little reduction of lead-based paint hazards. 210 Consequently, thousands of additional children are poisoned by lead each year.
At the same time, efforts to address lead-based paint hazards
nationally are stalemated. While market forces will begin exerting
some pressure for lead hazard reduction, this pressure is unlikely
to res,olve the impasse absent legislative change. The Title X Task
Force identified a number of reasons for the existing stalemate.
Property owners who wish to control lead hazards voluntarily are
currently paralyzed by the lack of uniform standards of care, and
there is no broad agreement on the steps that they should take to
protect occupants. from lead-based paint hazards. 211 Owners are
uncertain as to whether taking measures to control lead hazards
will protect them from damage claims or increase their ability to
get affordable insurance. 212 Many owners believe that it is necessary to remove all lead-based paint to protect against lead hazards,
at costs that they cannot afford. Moreover, with no clearly defined
standards of care, and with numerous and unpredictable tort cases
for damages to lead-poisoned children, insurance coverage for leadbased paint claims has been shrinking.213 This creates incentives for
209. See Schukoske, Evolving Paradigm, supra note 72, at 521 (noting that property
owners resist abatement because of high costs); see also id. at 529 (noting that landlords
successfully resist housing code enforcement by arguing that they will abandon properties
if forced to abate lead paint).
210. See id. at 525-36 (discussing ineffectiveness of housing and landlord-tenant
.
laws based on the housing paradigm).
211. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 45 (discussing lack of agreement
on steps property owners should take to protect occupants from lead-based paint hazards
and noting that laws addressing lead-based paint vary widely, are rarely protective or
preventive, and are sometimes outdated, calling for corrective measures now known to be
dangerous); see also Miceli et aI., supra note 157, at 29-38 (noting that legal duties
imposed upon landlords vary from no duty to inspect or abate to strict liability for injuries
caused by lead paint); LeVan, supra note 149, at 434.
212. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 111.
213. See id. at 111-12; ABATEMENT STANDARDS, supra note 79. Insurers have
concluded that lead-based paint hazards are commercially uninsurable for a number of
reasons. First, insurers have come to believe that lead poisoning suits occur so frequently
that they are no longer accidental or fortuitous. See Jackson L. Anderson & Lisa A.
Kershner, Maryland House Bill 760- "The Lead Poisoning Prevention Program," 48
CPUC J. 50, 51-52 (1995). Second, the outcome of lead paint litigation has been very
variable and unpredictable, particularly given the lack of generally accepted lead hazard
control standards, making it difficult for insurers to predict their potential losses with any
degree of accuracy. See id. In addition, defending lead poisoning cases is expensive, while
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owners to sell older, more affordable housing.214 All of these factors
will frustrate private lead hazard control efforts in California and
lead to the loss of affordable housing stock.
Without a comprehensive legislative solution, moreover, the
legal landscape will become perilous for property owners and other
stakeholders. As the number of children diagnosed with lead poisoning grows, California is likely to experience a wave of tort
litigation, with more parties entangled in litigation, and occasional
huge verdicts awarded. 215 Moreover, as the number of local ordinances increases, property owners will face a widening range of
divergent lead hazard controls standards.

v.

WHAT OTHER STATES HAVE DONE

Over half of all states have "secondary prevention" lead poisoning laws that require screening of children for lead or intervention in cases of lead-poisoned children, or that establish training
and certification requirements for lead-related workers. 216 Many
states have adopted training and certification requirements or are
likely to do so in the near future in order to receive authorization
from the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to administer
these standards under Title X.217 As noted above, the California
lead laws currently follow this secondary prevention model. 218
Several states have taken additional steps toward implementing a "primary prevention" approach to lead poisoning. In some
premiums for general liability insurance covering habitational risks have traditionally been
low. See id.
214. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 111-12.
215. See id. at 111 (noting that the number of lead-based paint damage cases
appears to be increasing nationwide); see also LeVan, supra note 149, at 429 (predicting
that the number of lead poisoning cases against landlords will rise rapidly in coming
years); Francken, supra note 22, at 552 ("[The] childhood lead-based paint poisoning
epidemic has led to massive litigation"). Where liability is found, lead poisoning cases
can result in large verdicts because of the severity of injuries and the fact that children
are involved. See Richard Fogel, Litigation and Lead Paint Claims, 42 RISK MGMT. 38
(1995). New York City is currently facing a liability explosion of claims filed on behalf
of children exposed to lead in city apartments, which could cost as much as $500 million
to resolve over the next several years. See Matthew Purdy, Suits on Lead Are Costly For
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995, at A12.
216. See Miceli et aI., supra note 157, at 36 (listing statutes); Tiller, supra note 73,
at 268 (listing statutes).
217. See 15 U.S.C. § 2684 (1994). The EPA will enforce the requirements in states
that do not receive authorization by August 31, 1998. See 40 C.P.R. § 745 (1996).
218. See supra Part III.B.I.
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cases these steps are quite limited, such as requiring systematic
testing for lead at child-care and preschool facilities,219 or encouraging the testing of residences or other buildings to identify lead
hazards. 220 Connecticut has gone considerably further, imposing an
obligation on property owners to abate defective lead-based paint
on all interior and exterior surfaces (including common areas) in
residences in which children under the age of six live. 221 Connecticut law, however, unlike the Massachusetts and Maryland statutes
discussed below, does not require proactive testing and evaluation
by property owners and does not address the array of other issues
required for a comprehensive solution to the lead-based paint problem.
Only a very few states have adopted comprehensive "primary
prevention" lead-based paint statutes. 222 The most far-reaching statutes are those of Massachusetts and Maryland. Not coincidentally,
these states have also experienced the most lead-poisoning litigation. Vermont has also recently passed a modest statute, and other
states with lead-based paint task forces are at various stages in
their proposals for comprehensive preventative legislation. As of
March 1997, none of the proposals have been adopted, however.223

219. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1319-B (West Supp. 1995) (requiring all
residential child-care facilities and pre-school facilities to have lead inspections at least
every three years unless the facility has been certified as lead-safe within the past three
years or as lead-free); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-24.6-14 (1996) (requiring that "as a condition
of licensure, all preschools, day care facilities, nursery schools, public and private
elementary schools and schoolyards, public playgrounds, and shelters and foster homes
serving children under the age of six" must be periodically inspected and declared lead
safe or lead free).
220. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 254.17 (Supp. 1996) (authorizing state to promulgate
rules requiring that owners of pre-1978 rental properties likely to contain lead hazards
have lead inspections); see also Schukoske, Maryland's Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, supra note 122, at 31-32 (listing statutes); Tiller, supra note 73, at 268 & n.25
(listing statutes).
221. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-Ulc (Supp. 1996); CONN. AGENCIES REGS.
§ 19a-111-2 (1996). The New York City Housing Code also requires landlords to remove
or cover paint over a certain lead level in multiple unit dwellings built where children age
six and under reside. See NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2013(h) (1992).
222. See Jennifer L. Bush, The Federal Lead Poisoning Prevention Program:
Inadequate Guidance For an Expeditious Solution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. RBV. 645,
651-52 (1996) (arguing that states have failed to adopt primary prevention statutes because
of uncertainties about how to fund lead hazard controls and concerns about how to ensure
that controls are carried out properly).
223. For instance, Ohio's task force finished its recommendations for a comprehensive law in December 1995, but as of the end of 1996, no legislation had been introduced.
See Telephone Interview with Gene King, Ohio State Legal Servs. (Jan. 9, 1997).

1997]

The Lead Poisoning Challenge

423

The Massachusetts, Maryland and Vermont statutes all embody to some degree the environmental paradigm described by
Professor Schukoske: 224 they require that property owners take affirmative steps to identify and control lead-based paint hazards, and
that tenants be informed about the risks of lead-based paint. These
laws also attempt to address related liability, insurance, and financing issues.
The Massachusetts lead law225 requires that owners of pre1978 housing contain or abate lead-based paint hazards in any
dwelling in which a child under age six resides. 226 Owners have-the
option of implementing interim controls for up to two years before
permanently abating or containing all lead-based paint hazards.227
Owners who fail to comply with the law are strictly liable for all
damages to children under age six who are lead-poisoned;228 owners who obtain a letter of compliance from a licensed inspector are
subject only to liability in negligence.229 Sellers and lessors must
provide purchasers and tenants with notice about lead poisoning,
the possible presence of lead-based paint hazards in housing units,
and the lead law. 230 The law also requires that insurers provide
coverage for complying units,231 provides financing for lead hazard
control work,232 and prohibits "lead discrimination" in real estate
or rental dealings.233

224. See Schokoske, Evolving Paradigm, supra note 72, at 538-44.
225. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 189A-199B (Law. Co-op. 1995).
226. See id. ch. 111, § 197.
227. See id. ch. 111, § 197(b), (c). "Abatement" is defined as the removal and
replacement of paint, plaster, or other accessible structural material containing dangerous
levels of lead. See id. ch. 111, § 189A. "Containment" refers to the encapsulation,
covering, or enclosing of paint, plaster, or other accessible structural material containing
dangerous levels of lead. See id. The statute does not require abatement of all surfaces;
only lead-based paint on door frames, window sills, and other surfaces below five feet
must be abated or contained. See id. ch. 111, § 197(b)(2), (3). If encapsulation is chosen
as the method of containment, however, the surface of the architectural element (wall,
baseboard, window, etc.) must be encapsulated in its entirety rather than to a height of
only five feet. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 105, § 460.110(4) (1996).
228. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 199 (Law. Co-op. 1995).
229. See id. ch. 111, § 197(b), (c), 199.
230. See id. ch. 111, § 197A.
231. See id. ch. 175, § 111H(a). The only exception is where the injury or damage
is the result of gross or willful negligence. See id.
232. Specifically, it includes a state income tax credit that can be used for 'abatement
or interim controls, and establishes a state loan program. See id. ch. 62, § 6(e); ch. 111,
§ 197E.
233. See id. ch. 111, § 199A(a).
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The Massachusetts strategy is ground-breaking in many important respects and very protective of children's health. 234 Indeed,
recent evidence showing a significant decline in the number of
Massachusetts children diagnosed with lead poisoning attests to the
efficacy of the state's law.235 Nonetheless, the Massachusetts approach needs several important modifications. First, the statute's
requirement of abatement or containment is misplaced; this level
of control is not required to protect against most harmful exposures, is not always cost-effective, and may endanger the supply
of affordable housing. 236 In Connecticut, the requirement of abatement, defined in a comparable although not identical manner to
Massachusetts law,237 has been cited for contributing to the abandonment of hundreds of apartments. 238 Removal of lead-based paint
234. See Bush, supra note 222, at 675 (arguing that Massachusetts law should be
the model for other states).
235. See Judy Foreman, Mass. Rate of Lead Poisoning Hits Low: Level Seen As Best
in Industrial States, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 1997, at B5 (citing reports from the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health showing decreases in the number of lead-poisoned children and suggesting that Massachusetts' rate of lead poisoning is probably the
lowest of any industrial state).
236. See HUD GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at xx-xxiii, 1-3; TITLE X TASK FORCE,
supra note 1, at 9-14 (both recommending range of lead hazard control strategies as
appropriate to safely address lead-based paint hazards in cost-effective manner); UNDERSTANDING TITLE X, supra note 80, at 3-4 (stating that interim controls are appropriate for
immediate implementation on a much broader scale than longer-term abatement and may
prove to be cost-effective in many cases); see also HUD GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at
12-7 (noting that traditional abatement practices for removing lead-based paint, when
performed inadequately or without sufficient protection, increase lead exposures to children); Telephone Interview with Nick Farr, Executive Director, National Center for Lead
Safe Housing (Dec. 31, 1996) [hereinafter Farr Interview] (noting that in Massachusetts
there has been a high incidence of increases in children's blood lead levels after removal
of paint in occupied units).
237. Compare CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19a-111-1 (1996) (defining abatement as
the encapsulation, replacement or removal of paint, plaster, soil, or other material containing
toxic levels of lead and all clean-up, disposal and reoccupancy clearance testing) with
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 197 (Law. Co-op. 1995) (providing requirements for
abatement and containment imposed by Massachusetts law); see also supra notes 225-227
and accompanying text.
238. See Tom Condon, Lead Program May Spark Loss of Housing Stock, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 22, 1996, at A3 (arguing that thousands of apartments in Hartford will be
abandoned if landlords are forced to comply with Connecticut's lead ordinance because
of the high cost of abatement, estimated at $15,000 per unit); Tom Puleo, Hartford Pledges
to Help Landlords, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 23, 1996, at AID (stating that failure of
over 300 landlords in Hartford to comply with lead statute can be attributed in part to high
cost of abatement, which is approximately $12,000 to $15,000 per unit, and that Hartford
has record number of abandoned buildings); Tom Puleo & Liz Halloran, City Takes Steps
Against Landlords, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 21, 1996, at Al (stating that landlords in
New Haven abandoned buildings because of inability to afford lead abatement requirements).
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may even increase exposure if improperly performed. Second, the
statutory trigger for mandatory controls, the presence in a dwelling
of children under six, leaves too much potential for rental dis crimination against families with children, something that has in fact occurred in Massachusetts. 239 Finally, although a strict liability scheme
has certain merits, the strict liability standard is unacceptable to
most if not all property owners.
Maryland's legislation incorporates elements of the environmental paradigm but also borrows from the workers' compensation
model.240 It requires lessors of pre-1950 housing units to register
with a statewide rental registry,241 to provide notification to tenants
about their rights under the law,242 and to perform risk reduction
treatments to control lead hazards. 243 The treatments set forth in the
statute are a series of interim controls.244 These treatments are
required at turnover; property owners must complete the treatments
on at least one-half of their properties by 1999, and on all of them
by 2004.245 Units that dust tests reveal to be lead-free do not have
to implement these requirements. 246
A central flaw in the strategy adopted by Maryland is that it
does not require a lead dust clearance test to verify that the risk
reduction treatments have been effective in eliminating the lead
hazards. 247 The law also contains a highly controversial provision
shielding owners who are in compliance with the law from tort
liability, provided that they offer to pay medical and relocation
costs to children and affected households of up to $17,000. 248 The
239. See Tina Cassidy, New Lead Paint Law Slow to Create Impact: Lack of
Publicity Leaves Confusion, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1995, at 29.
240. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 6-801 to -852 (1996).
241. See id. § 6-811.
242. See id. § 6-820.
243. See id. § 6-815.
244. See id. § 6-815.
245. See id. § 6-817.
246. See id. § 6-804.
247. See id. § 6-815.
248. See id. § 6-828(b), -836. In partiCUlar, complying owners are shielded from
tort liability for injuries caused by ingestion of lead on the premises, provided that if an
owner is given notice that a child under age six or a pregnant woman has been found to
be lead-poisoned (defined by statute as having a blood lead level of 25 !!g/dL or greater),
that owner makes a "qualified offer" to the affected person. See id. § 6-828(b), -836. The
"qualified offer" consists of (1) relocation costs of moving the child's (or woman's)
household to "lead-safe" housing, up to a maximum of $9,500; and (2) costs for medical
treatment to mitigate the effects of lead poisoning to the extent they are not covered by
private health insurance or government medical assistance, up to a maximum of $7,500.
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purpose of this scheme is to provide resources for timely intervention in the case of poisoned children, rather than subjecting them
to the vagaries and delays of the tort system. 249 While highly attractive to property owners, the $7,500 cap on medical expenses
has justifiably been criticized as too low to meet the needs of
poisoned children. 25o The statute also excludes homes built between
1950 and 1978, despite the undisputed risks from lead poisoning
in these homes. 251
Vermont has also recently adopted legislation252 that represents
an important first step for dealing with lead-based paint hazards,
given the relatively small size of the problem in that state.2S3 The
statute requires property owners of pre-1978 homes to perform essential maintenance practices ("EMPs").254 While use of EMPs will
prevent a significant number of exposures from occurring,255 by
See id. § 6-839 to -840. Owners are not required to make a qualified offer, nor are the
representatives of a poisoned child required to accept it. However, owners in compliance
with the statute who have made a qualified offer are not subject to tort liability, except
where actual fraud in clearance testing is established. See id. § 6-836, -842. In addition,
insurers are required to cover claims against complying property owners for damages from
lead hazards to the extent of any qualified offer. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-704
(1997). An owner who fails to comply with the hazard reduction measures is presumed
not to have exercised due care with respect to lead hazards. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR.
§ 6-838(a) (1996).
249. See Anderson & Kershner, supra note 213, at 52; see also TITLE X TASK
FORCE, supra note I, at 119 (recommending that states create remedial compensation
systems).
250. See Schukoske, Maryland's Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, supra note
122, at 24 n.9. It is also far less than the amounts poisoned children have recovered in
some tort actions in Maryland, where awards for future medical expenses, as well as for
pain and suffering and economic damages, have reached as high as $8 million. See, e.g.,
1990s Verdicts, supra note 147, at 40, 49 (reporting Walker v. Thompson ($8 million
default judgment), Smith v. Baumgart ($1.5 million award)). Tenants and children's
advocates also have raised concerns about the degree to which the lead hazard controls
set by the statute adequately protect children. See Schukoske, Maryland's Lead Poisoning
Prevention Program, supra note 122, at 24 n.9, 36.
251. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 6-801(b)(I)(ii) (1996). Owners of post-1950
property can opt to comply with the statute's requirements for registration and lead hazard
treatments in order to benefit from the statute's liability protections. See id. A substantial
number of owners have elected to do this. See Farr Interview, supra note 236.
252. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1751-1765 (Supp. 1996).
253 .. The VernlOnt Lead Paint Hazard Commission, which drafted the legislation,
described it as a "modest program of lead hazard control ... which can be expanded upon
later, if necessary, as lead hazard reduction technology improves." Letter from Jeffrey D.
Francis, Chair, Vt. Lead Paint Hazard Comm., to Stephen Webster, President Pro Tempore,
Vt. State Senate, and Michael Obuchowski, Speaker of the Vt. House of Representatives
1 (Feb. 23, 1995) (on file with author).
254. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1759 (Supp. 1996). For a description of EMPs
proposed in the California legislation, see infra notes 282-284 and accompanying text.
255. The Title X Task Force suggests that adoption of EMPs nationwide will avoid
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their own definition these practices are designed to make housing
"lead-safer," but not "lead-safe," and therefore leave children at
risk for lead poisoning. 256 The Vermont law provides property owners with varying degrees of relief from tort and habitability claims,
depending on the severity of any poisoning that has occurred and
the extent of the hazard controls the owners have adopted. 257
In summary, while other state primary prevention laws provide
useful models, each has distinct drawbacks and limitations. The
Massachusetts law invites discrimination against children, requires
unduly expensive control measures, and is not a politically feasible
option in most if not all states. Maryland's strategy is insufficiently
protective of public health and imposes unreasonable limits on
recovery by poisoned children. Vermont's statute is designed only
as an incremental first step in preventing lead-based paint poisoning. A new approach is required.
VI. A

PROPOSED COMPREHENSIVE CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING

PREVENTION STATUTE FOR CALIFORNIA AND OTHER STATES

A. The Collaborative Process that Drafted California's
Legislation
Understanding the need for California to develop its own primary prevention statute and unwilling to wait for the state legislature or state health department to formally convene a statewide task
or reduce lead exposures in millions of units. See 'TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at
66.
256. See 'TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 66-68.
257. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1761 (Supp. 1996). Owners in compliance with
the statute can introduce this fact as evidence of reasonable care in a tort action for
damages by poisoned children. See id. § 1761(a). Owners who carry out additional lead
hazard controls beyond those required by statute and establish that their property is
"lead-safe" cannot be held liable for damages to lead-poisoned children, absent very
narrow circumstances. See id. § 1761(d). The statute provides a cause of action based on
a breach of the owner's duty of reasonable care. See id. § 1761(a). In addition, if a
"moderately" poisoned child (one with blood lead levels between 10 and 20 Jlg/dL) seeks
damages based on a breach of habitability theory, an owner in compliance with the law is
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of habitability under the statute. See id. § 1761(h).
The Vermont statute does not mandate that liability insurance for lead claims be
provided. If the availability of insurance for rental property owners decreases significantly,
however, the Commissioner of Banking, Insurance and Securities is authorized to issue
regulations to ensure that insurance is available for properties in compliance with the
statute. See id. § 1765(a).
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force,258 several advocacy groups and foundations in California
convened day-long "lead summits" in the San Francisco Bay Area
in 1993.259 These sessions were attended by stakeholders touched
by the problem of childhood lead poisoning.260 The stakeholders
represented were numerous and diverse, reflecting the cross-cutting
nature of the lead poisoning problem. 261 The goal of the summits
was to identify common interests among the parties and to jumpstart discussions about a collaborative effort to develop a statewide
policy for addressing lead poisoning. 262 Toward this goal, several
other informal hearings and workshops were held over the next two
years. 263
In 1994, the nonprofit organization Lead Safe California ("Lead
Safe") was formed, with the goal of bringing together all interested
public and private sector actors to develop and promote lead hazard
control policies. 264 Lead Safe's approach reflects a growing movement to attempt to resolve environmental policy disputes consensually through the use of public/private partnerships.265 Lead Safe
specifically followed the model of broad-based task forces used by
a number of other states, as well as the Title X Task Force, in
developing primary prevention lead legislation. 266 In early 1995,
Lead Safe, acting as a neutral organizer, convened a statewide
drafting committee to recommend and propose a comprehensive
lead poisoning prevention statute. The committee consisted of representatives from the following stakeholder communities: lenders,
insurers, apartment owners, realtors, labor, tenants, state regulatory
agencies, consumer attorneys, childrens' advocates, affordable hous-

258. See Interview with Ellen Widess, Executive Director, Lead Safe California, San
Francisco, Cal. (July 23, 1996) [hereinafter Widess Interview]. The California Legislature
has traditionally been reluctant to appoint statewide commissions financed by taxpayer
dollars. See id. Advocates were also concerned by the state health department's slow
implementation of its mandated responsibilities relating to lead. See id. For example, DHS
was required by a 1989 statute to adopt abatement regulations for lead paint in housing,
see supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text, but had not yet completed the regulations
by March 1997.
259. See Ellen Widess & Heidi Poppe, Preventing Childhood Lead Poisoning, 5
ENVTL. L. NEWS 16, 20-21 (1996).
260. See id.
261. See id. at 21.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See infra text accompanying notes 376-405.
266. See infra text accompanying notes 387-400.
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ing developers, environmental consultants, environmental groups,
and the academic community.267 The committee met monthly during
1995 to draft legislation. Lead Safe also convened several task
force meetings to solicit feedback from the larger body of interested stakeholders.
In early 1996, legislation implementing the major portion of
the drafting committee's recommendations was introduced in the
California legislature. The recommendations were incorporated into
two bills. Senate Bill 2080268 incorporated all of the task force's
recommendations, except for financing issues, which were included
in a second measure, Senate Bill 1960.269 The legislation progressed
through several Senate committees, but failed to win approval in
the Senate Appropriations Committee. 270 This legislation has been
reintroduced in the 1997 legislative session.271
B. The Proposed Legislation
The drafting committee's approach to some extent built on the
experience of other state laws. To a far greater degree, however, it
drew on the recommendations of the Title X Task Force, in particular Title X's dual focus on preventing childhood lead poisoning
and preserving safe and affordable housing. 272 The drafting committee debated the appropriateness of each of the Task Force's
major recommendations. By improving on the Title X approach in
several areas, the committee developed a sound and workable bill
267. See Memorandum from Lead Safe California, Drafting Comm. for Comprehensive Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Law (undated, on file with author).
268. S.B. 2080, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Text95 File [hereinafter SB 2080].
269. S.B. 1960, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Text95 File [hereinafter SB 1960].
270. SB 2080 was approved by the Senate Health and Human Services and Judiciary
Committees, but failed in the Senate Appropriations Committee. See O'Connell, Current
Bill Status: S.B. 2080 (visited Mar. 21, 1997) <http://www.sen.ca.gov/leginfolbilllpriorlsb/
from2000/sb2080Isvcappr.txt> (reporting roll call vote). SB 1960 passed the Senate
Revenue and Taxation Committee but was never voted on by the Senate Appropriations
Committee. See Calderon, Current Bill Status: S.B. 1960 (visited Mar. 21, 1997)
<http://www.sen.ca.govneginfolbilllpriorlsb/fromI900/sb 1960/status.txt>. .
271. See A.B. 481, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Sttext File [hereinafter AB 481]; S.B. 7-18, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997)
(available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttext File [hereinafter SB 718]. For a discussion about
why the 1996 legislation failed to advance, see infra notes 406-416 and accompanying
text.
272. See nTLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 9.
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that should be a model for other states. This section outlines the
key elements of the California measure and explains some of the
reasons for the drafting committee's decisions.273
1. Lead Hazard Evaluation and Control
With one major exception,274 the proposed legislation would
apply only to rental housing, deferring regulation of owner-occupied housing. 275 It would require that lead hazard evaluation and
control measures be implemented within three years for homes
built before 1950 and within seven years for property built between
1950 and 1978.276
The committee deliberated extensively about whether to impose stricter duties on housing units built before 1950, as opposed
to those built from 1950 to 1978, to reflect the more serious hazards posed by these older unitS.277 It chose not to do so, because
of the undisputed risks from lead poisoning in post-1950 homes.
The committee also considered using unit turnover as a primary
trigger for action, as suggested by the Title X Task Force, but
decided against it.278 Finally, the committee debated using the pres273. Much of the following discussion is based on the author's personal observations as a member of the drafting committee during 1995 and 1996. The author was a
member of the drafting committee that developed the California legislation.
274. The bill extends the requirements of safe work practices during construction
and renovation activities, and of appropriate training and certification for persons engaged
in lead-related work, to owner-occupied housing built before 1978. See infra note 312 and
accompanying text.
275. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.3(az) (defining key statutory term of
"pre-1978 residential housing").
276. SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.7(a).
277. The Title X Task Force followed this approach. See TITLE X TASK FORCE,
supra note 1, at 69-70. Under the Title X recommendations, absent either a lead-poisoned
child or identified lead-based paint hazards, owners of pre-1978 homes are required only
to follow essential maintenance practices (unless they conduct a lead-based paint inspection that finds no lead-based paint, in which case no further action is required). See id. at
69. Owners of pre-1950 property are required to obtain a risk assessment and control all
lead hazards or perform a series of "standard treatments" (unless an inspection finds no
lead-based paint). See id. at 64-66.
278. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 63. The Title X Task Force
recommended unit turnover as a key trigger because "owners strongly prefer doing work
when units are vacant", and control work can usually be integrated into maintenance and
repair work that should be performed by owners at turnover. See id.; see also FRAMEWORK
FOR ACTION, supra note 71, at 15-16 (proposing tenant turnover as trigger for lead-based
paint hazard evaluation and control requirements). Control work is likely to be substantially less expensive and less risky when units are vacant. The unit-turnover approach was
strongly favored by several members of the drafting committee. The committee elected
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ence of children under age six in a housing unit as the trigger for
requiring lead hazard evaluation and control,279 having heard testimony from property owners that absent such a limitation the statute
would force the remediation of thousands of units that pose no
health threat to their occupants. These concerns were ultimately
outweighed by the fear that a child-based trigger would lead to
discrimination in renting apartments against families with young
children.280 These threshold issues-particularly the first two--were
difficult to resolve and involved competing concerns; other states
would be on reasonable ground in departing from California's approach.
The basic scheme of lead hazard evaluation and controls in
Senate Bill 2080 would follow closely the structure proposed by
the Title X Task Force.281 First, EMPs would be required within six
months of the statute's effective date for all pre-1978 rental property.282 EMPs would be relatively inexpensive .additions to routine
maintenance practices and could be carried out by in-house personnel once these workers received a short training course. These
EMPs would focus on routinely inspecting for and repairing deteriorating paint, responding to tenants' reports of peeling paint or
other conditions, and avoiding unsafe paint removal practices that
are currently in widespread use. 283 The costs of these practices to
not to mandate any duties at turnover, however, because of property owners' concerns that
they would not always be able to obtain necessary financing for performing controls at
the time of turnover or that obtaining financing might result in a delay of several months
during which the units would remain vacant. In addition, unit turnover may be infrequent
in rent control jurisdictions like San Francisco. Nonetheless, the committee anticipated
that many owners would choose to undertake controls during turnover.
279. Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York City rely on this approach. See
discussion regarding Massachusetts, supra notes 225-229 and accompanying text, discussion regarding Connecticut, supra note 221 and accompanying text, and discussion regarding
New York City, supra note 221.
280. This has occurred in Massachusetts. See Cassidy, supra note 239. Both federal
and California law prohibit discrimination against families with children and discrimination based on family status. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994); CAL. Crv. CODE § 51 (West
1982 & Supp. 1996); Marina Point v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982) (affirming
inclusion of discrimination based on family status under CAL. Crv. CODE § 51). Discrimination nonetheless remains a significant problem.
281. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 64-86.
282. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.6.
283. See id. § 105315.6(a), (b); TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 66-68. EMPs
include the use of safe work practices during maintenance work that disturbs lead-based
paint or presumed lead-based paint (i.e., no dry scraping, water blasting, or open-flame
burning to remove lead-based paint); annual visual inspections for deteriorated paint;
written notice to tenants asking them to report deteriorating paint; and prompt repair of
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property owners would be quite modest, estimated to range from
$50 to $75' annually per unit in a large rental property and from
$85 to $110 for a single-unit property.284
Beyond the universal requirement of EMPs, which is as far as
the Vermont primary prevention law goes,285 the proposed bill would
provide owners with considerable flexibility in addressing leadbased paint hazards. 286 This is an important advantage over the
Massachusetts and Maryland lead laws. 287 First, under the proposed
California law, owners could conduct a lead-based paint inspection
to determine whether or not any lead-based paint was present on
their property.288 If there was none, their duties would be dramatically curtailed under the law.289 Owners with property free of leadbased paint would still have ,to follow safe work practices and
respond to complaints regarding lead-poisoned children.29o
Second, owners could test whether and to what extent lead hazards were present in their specific units by conducting a risk assessment or lead hazard screen.291 Alternatively, they could presume
that such hazards· existed and control, for them with a predetermined set of measures known as "Minimum Lead Hazard Controls."292 The latter approach could save owners up to several hundeteriorated lead-based paint or presumed lead-based paint. See SB 2080, supra note 268,
§ 105315.6(b). Workers performing these practices must be trained pursuant to state or
federal guidelines. See id. § 105315.6(c).
284. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 82. These are national figures; costs
in California may be higher as there is a less well-developed lead hazard control industry
than in other states. See Farr Interview, supra note 236.
285. See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text.
286. In this respect, the bill follows many of the recommendations developed by
HUD for lead hazard control activities in federally assisted housing. See supra notes 85-87
and accompanying text; see also HUD GUIDELINES, supra note 46.
287. See supra notes 225-229, 236-239, 241-246 and accompanying text.
288. See, SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.5.
289. See id.
290. See infra notes 309-312 and accompanying text.
291. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.7(a). A risk assessment is an evaluation conducted by an independent risk assessor or inspector to determine the nature,
severity, and location of lead hazards and to identify options for controlling any lead
hazards found. See id. § 105315.3(bh). It always includes visual examination for deteriorating paint and collection of surface dust samples, and may also include collection of soil
samples. See id. The presence of lead hazards is determined based on the HUD Guidelines
and DHS regulations. See id. A lead hazard screen is an abbreviated risk assessment that
takes fewer dust samples and uses more conservative criteria than a full risk assessment.
See id. § 105315.3(aj).
292. See id. § 105315.7(f). Minimum Lead Hazard Controls include performing
essential maintenance practices; providing smooth and cleanable horizontal surfaces;
covering or restricting access to bare soil unless it is found not to be lead-contaminated;
correcting conditions in which lead-based paint or presumed lead-based paint is rubbing
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dred dollars per unit on evaluation costs and might be the most
cost-effective strategy for many properties. 293 On the other hand, a
risk assessment might show that there were no or only limited
lead-based paint hazards, in which case the cost of both evaluation
and appropriate controls might be less than the cost of minimum
hazard contro1s.294
Third, once a risk assessment or screen identified specific lead
hazards, owners would· have several options for controlling these
hazards. 295 They could opt for interim short-term controls, longerterm abatement, or a mix of interim and longer-term contro1s. 296 In
the case of property with five or more units, owners could implement property-wide strategies, through a lead hazard control plan
developed by a certified risk assessor.297
Interim controls are defined as measures that reduce exposure
to lead hazards temporarily, and include dust removal,· paint film
stabilization, treatment of friction and impact surfaces, installation
of soil coverings, specialized cleaning, repairs, and other measures. 298 Longer-term abatement measures are designed to ·eliminate
hazards for at least twenty years and include the removal, enclosure, or encapsulation of lead-based paint, the replacement of l;milding components, the removal of lead-contaminated soil, and other
steps.299 A lead hazard control plan would allow owners of multiunit properties to prioritize control work based on the. age and
condition of units, as well as the risks posed to occupants, inchlding the presence of children in a unit, rather than having to control
hazards on a unit-by-unit basis.30o

or being crushed or is on readily accessible chewable surfaces; and using specialized
cleaning after perfonning controls. See id. Units in which these controls are implemented
must pass dust clearance tests. See id.
293. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note I, at 62-63. Where units are in good
condition, moreover, the costs of the controls may be small. See id. at 72.
294. See id. at 72.
295. This approach gives owners flexibility in controlling identified lead-based paint
hazards as recommended by the Title X Task Force. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note
1, at 70-76.
296. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.8(b).
297. See id. § 105315.8(a)(2).
298. See id. § 105315.3(x).
299. See id. § 105315.3(a). SB 2080 thus follows the definition of abatement used
by Title X. See supra note 81.
300. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.8(a)(2). A lead hazard control plan is
defined as a plan to implement evaluation and control methods in all units in accordance
with a schedule based on the units' age and condition. See id. § 105315.3(af). The plan
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Interim controls would be much less expensive than permanent
abatement measures, which can range from $7,500 to $40,000 per
unit. 30 ! For example, for larger properties able to take advantage of
representative sampling techniques, interim controls might be up
to forty times less expensive than permanent abatement measures. 302
Thus, the proposed California legislation would accomplish health
protective lead hazard controls at considerably lower cost than the
Massachusetts lead law. 303
The California bill provides that all lead hazard evaluation and
control work must be carried out by properly trained and certified
workers. 304 One knotty problem considered by the drafting committee was how to ensure a large enough trained work force of lead
contractors without unduly delaying implementation of the statutory duties. On the one hand, as of late 1996, there were probably
no more than several hundred formally trained and certified contractors in California,305 and the legislation would eventually affect
millions of units in the state. 306 On the other hand, the slow development of the lead hazard control industry is largely attributable
to the lack of demand for control work, the absence of clear control
standards, and the unavailability of appropriate training courses for
contractors. The committee concluded that delaying the statute's
must be developed and approved by a certified independent risk assessor. See id.
§ 105315.8(a)(2).
301. See ABATEMENT STANDARDS, supra note 79.
302. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 85-86. The Title X Task Force
estimated the costs of interim controls as follows: (1) for a 200-unit property: to implement risk assessments and hazard controls, $105-$125 per unit annually over a 1O-year
period; for a lead hazard control plan, $80-$100 per unit; and for controls comparable to
the minimum lead hazard controls under SB 2080, $175 per unit; (2) for a 50-unit
property: $120-$140 per unit for risk assessment and hazard controls; $95-$115 per unit
for a lead hazard control plan; and $215 per unit for minimum lead hazard controls; and
(3) for a single unit property: $240-$260 per unit for risk assessment and lead hazard
controls; and $330 per unit for minimum lead hazard controls. See id. at 85-86. These
estimates are necessarily very rough, grouping divergent types of property together, and
costs will vary depending upon the condition of units and the extent of hazards, as well
as on the timing of the controls; controls will be considerably cheaper if units are vacant
or if the controls are performed in conjunction with remodeling or renovation projects.
See id. Costs should decline in the future as technology improves and as the industry
becomes more competitive. See id. at 79. As noted above, California costs may be higher
than the national average. See supra note 284.
303. See supra notes 236-238 and accompanying text.
304. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.6(c).
305. See Memorandum from Theresa Saunders, Lead Accreditation & Certification
Unit, Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch, Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., to Merill
Byce, Lead Safe California (Oct. 23, -1996) (on file with author).
306. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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implementation was unwise (and possibly counter-productive), and
that setting specific effective dates for the statute would spur the
growth of a lead hazard control industry.307 Strong anecdotal evidence suggests that this has occurred in Massachusetts in response
to the state's lead hazard control requirements. 308
Finally, all owners of pre-1978 rental property would be required to respond to cases of lead-poisoned children or deteriorating lead-based paint found in one or more of their units.309 Owners
would have to cooperate with local health agencies and promptly
follow their directives for lead hazard controL 310 Owners would
also be prohibited from renting a unit where a lead-poisoned child
resided unless the unit had passed a clearance examination demonstrating compliance with state or federal lead exposure levels.311 All
owners of pre-1978 property (both rental and owner-occupied) would
also be required to follow safe work practices on any construction
activity that disturbed painted surfaces, a significant source of lead
exposures. 312

307. The bill gives DHS the option of extending the three-year and seven-year
deadlines if there is not a sufficiently large trained work force. See SB 2080, supra note
268, § 105315.7(a)(3). Two years after the effective date of the statute, DHS would be
required to assess the number of certified risk assessors, inspectors, and lead hazard
control personnel, and report to the Legislature as to whether there was a sufficient trained
work force to meet the statutory deadlines. DHS would then be able to extend the deadlines
if necessary "after considering health and safety concerns." Id.
308. See Bush, supra note 222, at 658-59 (quoting testimony of Stephanie Pollack
of the Conservation Law Foundation). But cf. Louis DiGiovanni, Note, New York City's
School Asbestos Debacle: An Administrative Approach to The Problem of Faulty School
Inspections And a Possible New Round of Asbestos Litigation, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
79, 98 (1994) (discussing school districts' difficulties in meeting original deadlines
imposed by Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, TSCA § 204(b)(I), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2644(b)(1) (1994), for inspecting school buildings for asbestos-containing material and
eliminating asbestos hazards because of a lack of qualified inspectors).
309. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.10-.14.
310. See id. § 105315.11.
311. See id. § 105315.13. Owners would also be required to provide temporary
relocation assistance to the household of a lead-poisoned child unless the local agency
determined that temporary relocation of the family was not necessary. See id. § 105315.12.
The drafting committee could not reach consensus about the larger issue of relocation
assistance to tenants in other circumstances where lead hazard control work was being
performed, and therefore left that issue open.
312. See id. § 105315.33. The bill would require contractors to assume that all
painted surfaces contained lead-based paint unless owners could provide copies of reports
that confirmed the absence of lead-based paint and lead-based paint hazards. See id.
§ 105315.34(a). The owner would also need a clearance test performed by a qualified,
independent third party after completion oflead-related work. See id. § 105315.34(d).
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2. Notice and Disclosure
The bill mandates that, in addition to the disclosures required
by Title X, property owners provide both prospective tenants and
existing occupants (a group overlooked by federal disclosure requirements) with notice of the provisions of the state law, notice
of the importance of promptly reporting deteriorating paint (and
the name of a person to contact), and notice recommending that,
if a child in the unit is found to be lead-poisoned, other children
occupying the same unit should be screened for lead poisoning. 313
3. Liability Relief
One of the most contentious issues in the drafting process was
whether and to what degree tort relief should be provided to owners who comply with the statutory requirements. Property owners
claimed that this incentive was necessary to make it worthwhile
for them to expend money on controls and not disinvest in their
buildings. Insurers maintained that some tort relief would make it
easier to predict the number and size of claims and to increase the
availability of insurance. Consumer attorneys countered that tort
relief was unnecessary because compliance would reduce the amount
of lead poisoning and litigation and because owners would be able
to raise compliance as evidence that they had satisfied the legal
standard of care. 314 Additionally, there are market incentives for
property owners that flow from compliance, or from steps taken
beyond compliance, to make housing units "lead free", or "safe
from lead hazards."315
The prevailing consensus was that some incentives would be
helpful in promoting lead hazard control efforts, and the bill thus
provides that compliance with the law would entitle owners to a
rebuttable presumption of due care in an action for damages.316 The
presumption could only be rebutted in three narrow circumstances:
313. See id. § 105315.23, .24.
314. Consumer attorneys also argued that tort claims involving lead-poisoned children are difficult to prove.
315. See Miceli et aI., supra note 157, at 39. These market incentives include the
availability of financing, liability insurance, or the ability to market units as free from any
lead. See id.
316. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.22(a).
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(1) the lead safe certificate documenting compliance was fraudulently obtained;317 (2) the owner was in violation of the statutory
duties; or (3) the owner had actual knowledge of lead hazards or
a changed condition that might affect lead-based paint or soil and
did not repair the condition or control the hazard within a reasonable time period, presumed to be thirty days.318 The presumption
would last for the duration of the lead safe certificate, which would
be appropriate, given that many of the control strategies that owners may use under the bill are interim in nature. 319 Thus, unlike the
Maryland320 or Vermont321 statutes, the California law would provide liability relief only for truly health protective -control measures.
A related issue was the extent of liability relief that should be
provided for lenders in the event that they foreclose on property
containing lead-based paint hazards. Lenders, acutely aware of the
possibility of large damage awards against them322 and stung by the
liability they have incurred under other environmental statutes,323
argued for a broad exemption with few concomitant obligations.
This position was strenuously opposed by consumer attorneys. The
drafting committee did not want to discourage investment in older
properties because of the lenders' fear of large damage awards, but
also was concerned about ensuring that lead hazard risks would be
minimized while lenders owned property and that compensation
would be available for children who were poisoned by lead. While

317. A lead safe certificate is a certificate issued by an independent clearance
examiner indicating that all lead hazards in a housing unit have been controlled to levels
that meet federal or state standards. See id. § 105315.3(am).
318. See id. § I05315.22(b). The Title X Task Force proposed far more extensive
changes to the liability system, including a complete liability defense for owners whose
units have no lead-based paint, and a rebuttable presumption that property owners who
failed to implement any required controls knew about the presence of lead-based paint.
See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note I, at 116-17.
319. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note I, at 113 (recommending that the degree
of liability relief should be proportionate to extent of hazard control).
320. See supra notes 248-250 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., 1990s Verdicts, supra note 147, at 35 (reporting Taylor v. FDIClPlymouth Home Bank, which involved settlement against property trustee and manager,
Plymouth Home National Bank, for $2.175 miIIion).
323. The most prominent example is the federal Superfund law. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994); see also United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 E2d 1550, 1557
(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that secured creditors could incur liability under Superfund by
participating in financial management of facility to degree indicating capacity to influence
corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes).
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the committee failed to reach agreement on this issue, a reasonable
compromise would be to follow the Title X Task Force's recommendations, which give lenders a limited form of liability relief
provided that they act promptly to sell the property, implement
essential maintenance practices, and respond promptly to tenants'
complaints and to notification about poisoned children. 324

4. Insurance
Increasing the availability of insurance for lead-based paint
claims is a pivotal part of any comprehensive solution to the leadbased paint problem. Without insurance, property owners, particularly owners of low- and moderate-income housing, face the risk
of substantial financial losses because of the presence of lead-based
paint, leading some to abandon their properties, or to refuse to rent
to families with children.325 By the same token, the availability of
insurance should create important incentives for owners to reduce
lead-based paint hazards, as insurers are likely to require owners
to implement control measures as a condition of obtaining coverage. 326 The Title X Task Force recommended that states adopt legislation designed to increase the availability of insurance for leadbased paint claims.327
, In California, insurance industry representatives participating
in the drafting process opposed any measure that would mandate
coverage for lead-based paint under third-party liability policies,
as has happened in other states considering similar legislation. 328
These representatives also forecast that establishing a clear, health324. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note I, at 103. The Task Force noted that
requiring major physical investments in lead hazard control would not be appropriate
because these are typically the work of long term owners. See id.
325. See ABATEMENT STANDARDS, supra note 79.
326. See id. Insurance also helps ensure that the victims of lead poisoning are
adequately compensated for their injuries. See id.
327. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note I, at 123. Such legislation could require
coverage of lead-based paint claims to the same extent as other liability claims in
comprehensive general liability policies for units in compliance with lead hazard control
standards, prohibit the exclusion of lead-based paint claims from these policies, or set
premiums for policies covering claims. See id.
328. See Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Francis, Chair of the Vt. Lead Paint
Hazard Comm. (June 21, 1996) [hereinafter Francis Interview] (describing Vermont
process); Telephone Interview with Stu Greenberg, Executive Director, Envt!. Health
Watch, Cleveland, Ohio (July 11, 1996) [hereinafter Greenberg Interview] (describing
Ohio process).
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protective standard of care for property owners would likely result
in a sufficiently predictable pattern of claims to make insuring for
lead-based paint injuries viable, without the need to mandate insurance coverage. 329 The drafting committee chose not to mandate
the provision of insurance, accepting the insurers' argument and
hoping that market forces would be stimulated adequately by the
adoption of standards of care.330 The California bill would require
that the State Insurance Commissioner take "all appropriate actions" to encourage and assist the insurance industry in creating
lead liability coverage for owners and contractors who have complied with the statute. 331 This approach is consistent with the Vermont strategy,332 but weaker than the Maryland333 and Massachusetts334 statutes, which require coverage for complying units. In the
absence of significant liability limits (such as those contained in
Maryland's law), however, this is probably all that is realistically
achievable in most states given the political clout of the insurance
industry.

5. Enforcement
The California legislation would amend existing housing law
to provide that the presence of uncontrolled lead hazards iIi residential property is a condition that constitutes substandard housing
under the State Housing Law,335 untenantable housing in violation
of the warranty of habitability,336 and a private nuisance. 337 This
329. See Anderson & Kershner, supra note 213, at 52 (listing conditions the
insurance industry in Maryland identified as necessary to make lead risks insurable).
Generally, insurance officials want limits placed on owners' liability after implementation
of lead hazard controls. See ABATEMENT STANDARDS, supra note 79.
330. See ABATEMENT STANDARDS, supra note 79 (suggesting that adoption of lead
hazard control standards will trigger insurance coverage for property owners). This GAO
report also concluded that the adoption of standards of care would increase the availability
of insurance coverage for lead abatement contractors. This occurred with asbestos contractors during the mid-1980s. See id.
331. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.46.
332. See supra note 257.
333. See supra note 248.
334. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
335. See SB 2080, supra note 268, at Sec. 4 (proposing amendments to CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17920.3(p)).
336. See SB 2080, supra note 268, at Sec. 1 (proposing amendments to CAL. ClV.
CODE § 1941.1(i)).
337. See SB 2080, supra note 268, at Sec. 3 (proposing new CAL. ClV. CODE
§ 3485).
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should facilitate enforcement by local agencies, which will be able
to investigate lead-related violations as part of ordinary code inspections. 338
. The bill would also provide for administrative, civil, and criminal
sanctions. 339 It would place primary enforcement authority with
local building,. health, and environmental agencies that are currently responsible for ensuring compliance with local and state
housing- codes. 340 The State Department of Health Services would
have oversight authority to ensure consistent statutory enforcement
as well as authority under the statute to enforce provisions of
statewide importance,. such as the bill's training and certification
requirements.341 The bill also provides for private enforcement of
the statute by any "affected person", defined to include any occupant, neighbor, worker, or adjacent property owner whose health
and safety may be affected by violation of the statutory requirements,342 Modeled after federal environmental citizen suit provisions,343 this section would authorize private suits provided that 120
days notice had been given to public enforcement agencies and that
no government agency was diligently prosecuting an action. 344 Environmental citizen suits are an important supplement to government enforcement. 345 Given the number of housing units that would
be subject to the statute and the budgetary constraints facing local
enforcing agencies, private enforcement would be critical to ensur338. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 93-94; see a/so Schukoske. Evolving
Paradigm, supra note 72, at 528-29 (observing that code enforcement has been largely
ineffective, in part because agencies do not test for presence of lead-based paint or evaluate
for lead hazards as part of regular housing inspections).
339. See SB 2080, ,supra note 268, §§ 105315.40(c), .41(c), .42; see a/so Schukoske, Evolving Paradigm, supra note 72, at 558 (stressing importance of including criminal
and civil sanctions in any comprehensive lead-based paint legislation negotiated among
numerous stakeholders).
340. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.39(a); see also supra text accompanying note 126 (describing authority of local agencies under existing law).
341. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.39.
342. See id. § 105315.43(a).
343. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) (citizen suit
provision); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (citizen suit provision).
Although citizen suit provisions are a common feature of federal environmental laws. few
California statutes authorize them. A notable exception is Proposition 65. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5-.13 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); see also supra Part
m.B.2.d.
344. See SB 2080, supra note 268, § 105315.43(b).
345. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular
Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Allthority Is Shared by the
United States, the States, and Their Citizens, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552. 1651-55 (1995).
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ing compliance with the law. The inclusion of this feature would
make California's enforcement provisions the strongest of any state's
primary prevention laws. Notably, the provision for private enforcement generated significant support from property owners concerned about contamination from the unsafe work practices of their
neighbors.

6. Financing
To perform the lead hazard control measures that would be
required by the statute, many property owners would likely require
financial assistance. While some would be able to obtain private
loans,346 others would need some type of subsidy from the government. This is particularly true for owners of low-income or distressed housing, which contains many of the units most in need of
controls. 347
While in theory a range of financing schemes is possible,348 in
practice California faces enormous legal and political constraints .
that limit any new government spending. For example, increases in
state taxes must be approved by a two-thirds vote,349 and the "Gann
346. The establishment of well-defined standards of care will increase the availability of private financing, since banks will be able to incorporate the standards in their
underwriting criteria, and thereby ensure against the risks associated with loans to
properties with lead-based paint hazards. See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 10l.
347. See id. at 98. A substantial part of this housing stock is also neglected and in
violation of existing housing code requirements. The drafting committee struggled with
the prospect that providing subsidies to distressed housing might mean subsidizing
"slumlords" in order to achieve the larger goal of protecting the health of poor children.
After weighing competing considerations, the committee concluded that this possibility
was acceptable.
348. For example, the Massachusetts Housing Financing Agency offers below-market interest loans to low-income borrowers engaged in lead-based paint hazard control
(so-called "get the lead out" loans). See TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 105. The
Maryland Community Development Agency offers a forgivable deferred payment loan for
lead-based paint hazard control. See id. The City of Milwaukee and the Minnesota Housing
Finance Agency provide direct grants and services to assist with hazard control efforts.
See id. Other cities, like San Francisco, have been able to establish loan programs for
property owners with grants from HUD's Lead-based Paint Hazard Reduction Program.
See GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVTL. LAW AND JUSTICE CLINIC, LANDLORD'S HANDBOOK:
GUIDE TO PROMOTING LEAD SAFE HOUSING 10 (1995). A tax on paint manufacturers has
often been proposed as a means of financing lead hazard control work-for the obvious
reason that the industry is the most blameworthy party in the current situation-but no
state has successfully enacted such a tax. See Interview with Stephanie Pollock, Senior
Attorney, Construction Law Foundation, San Francisco, Cal. (July 23, 1996) [hereinafter
Pollock Interview]. See generally TITLE X TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 98-109 (suggesting other private and public financing mechanisms).
349. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3.
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spending limit" constrains public agency expenditures. 35o General
obligation bonds must be approved by the voters. 351 It is difficult
even to obtain a place on the electoral ballot for these measures,
which requires approval by the legislature, let alone to obtain
approval by the voters. "Fees" can be adopted by a simple majority
vote of the legislature, but fees must be limited to the costs of an
impact created by, or governmental service used by, the entity
paying the fee.3S2 Thus, California's attempt to fund even its modest
childhood lead poisoning prevention program with a fee on paint
manufacturers and oil companies is in legal jeopardy.353 Politically,
tax increases have long been extremely unpopular in California,
and the election of fiscally conservative legislatures in recent years
has made any new tax or spending program extremely unlikely.
Local governments in California will also have a more difficult
time raising money due to the passage of Proposition 218354 in
1996. Proposition 218 imposes new procedural requirements on the
imposition of taxes, fees, and assessments by local governments. 3SS
Faced with these hurdles, the drafting committee proposed
enactment of a tax credit as an incremental measure for financing
lead hazard control activities. A tax credit does not require the
administrative expenses of loan or grant programs, does not appear
as a line item on the state appropriations budget (which helps
insulate it somewhat from state budget battles), and does not trigger many of the legal and political hurdles associated with creating
a pool of money for a new grant or loan program.356 A tax credit
is also of greater economic benefit to owners than other tax incentives because it permits them to reduce tax liability on a dollar-fordollar basis.
350. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 1 (limiting increases in the size of annual
appropriations of state and local governments to increases in the cost of living and in
population).
351. See id.
352. See City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 133-34 (Ct. App.
1996).
353. See Sinclair Paint Co. v. Board of Equalization, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572 (Ct. App.
1996) (holding that fees imposed under the Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Act were
an unconstitutional tax enacted by less than a super-majority of the legislature), review
granted, 920 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1996).
354. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIC, §§ 1-3, art. XIIID, §§ 1-6.
355. See id.; see also Proposition 218: Text of Proposed Law (visited Mar. 21, 1997)
<http:/Note96.ss.ca.govNote96lhtmllBP/218text.htm>.
356. See Andrew Shagrin, Lead Hazard Reduction Financing, Drafting Committee
Working Group Summary 3-4 (Nov. 1, 1995) (unpublished report, on file with author).
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The drafting committee's financing proposal, embodied in Senate
Bill 1960,357 provides for a low-income housing credit of up to
twenty percent of the money spent per dwelling unit on qualified
lead hazard control activities, with a maximum of $2,000 per unit. 358
Eligible properties under the bill are residential rental dwellings that
were built prior to 1950 and have no more than fifty units;359
eligible activities are longer-term abatement measures360 and relocation of tenants from units where there is a lead-poisoned child
in order to perform lead hazard controls.361 For low-income housing
units, the statute also increases, for one year only, the low-income
housing credit from $35 million to $50 million, and requires that
$7.5 million of this credit be spent on lead hazard control activities. 362
The assistance provided by Senate Bill 1960 admittedly would
be quite limited, reflecting the severe political difficulties in the
current legislative climate. In the future, other approaches, such as
those adopted by other states,363 including loan guarantees, direct
grants, loans through the California Housing Finance Agency, and
other measures, would be needed to ensure financial assistance to
all qualifying low- and moderate-income property owners. The
costs of such programs would be significant, and thus are likely to
be strongly resisted. But, over the long term, California will face
even greater costs in medical treatment, special education costs,
lost wages, lower productivity, increased juvenile delinquency, and
adult health problems if lead poisoning continues unabated.
The costs of not legislating on lead hazards are graphically
illustrated by a recent DHS analysis.364 Considering just the 14,000
357. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
358. See SB 1960, supra note 269, at Sec. 5 (proposing new CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE § 17053.18(a)).
359. See SB 1960, supra note 269, at Sec. 5 (proposing new CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE § 17053.18(d)(I)).
360. See SB 1960, supra note 269, at Sec. 5 (proposing new CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE § 17053.18(e)(I)); see also discussion supra notes 295-302 and accompanying text
(explaining longer-term abatement measures).
361. See SB 1960, supra note 269, at Sec. 5 (proposing new CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE § 17053.18(e)(2)).
362. See SB 1960, supra note 269, at Sec. 4 (amending CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 17058(g)).
363. See supra note 348.
\
364. See Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch, Cal. Dep't of Health Servs.,
The Costs of Non-Prevention 1-2 (Sept. 1996) (unpublished analysis, on file with author)
[hereinafter Costs of Non-Prevention]. DHS explains that the actual benefits in increased

444

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 21

California children currently estimated to have a blood lead level
of at least 25 %g/dL, DHS estimates that the costs of medical care
and special education will be at least $65 million; over the next 20
years, this number will grow to $259 million.365 DHS further concludes .that the estimated benefit in lifetime earnings achieved by
reducing blood lead levels by just one microgram per deciliter in
the 254,000 California children currently with blood lead levels
greater than 10 %g/dL would be $291 million. 366 These figures do
not include a host of difficult to quantify benefits that stem from
preventing lead poisoning, such as averted human suffering, reduced childhood anemia, reduced school failures and dropouts,
lower public safety expenditures in the juvenile and criminal justice systems, and reduced hypertension, strokes, and heart attacks
among adults. 367

VII.

THE NEXT STEP FOR CALIFORNIA

Drafting a bill that attempted to reconcile the numerous and
disparate interests of the stakeholders affected by the lead-based
pamt problem' was a daunting task. The legislation is not without
missing pieces. As outlined above, its proposed financing mechanism will only provide funding for a fraction of the state's housing
units likely to need some public subsidy.368 The bill also leaves
open the divisive question of the duties of, and liability relief for,
lenders who foreclose on property with lead-based paint hazards. 369
Other provisions in the bill relating to relocation assistance for
tenants in units with identified lead hazards, the size of penalties
for statutory violations, the extent of preemption of local ordinances, and the scope of the safe work practice requirements also
were not firmly resolved.
lifetime earnings are likely to be much greater than $291 million because the average
blood lead level of lead-poisoned or lead-exposed children decreases considerably after
intervention. See id. at 1. DHS's estimates are based on data in the CDC STRATEGIC PLAN,
supra note 24, and in Joel Schwartz, Societal Benefits of Redllcing Lead ExposlIre, 66
ENVTL. REs. 105 (1994).
365. See Costs of Non-Prevention, sllpra note 364, at 2.
366. See id.
367. See id.
368. See slIpra text accompanying notes 356-363.
369. See SlIpra notes 322-324 and accompanying text.
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None of these shortcomings, however, is fatal, and Senate Bill
2080 still represents an attractive legislative approach to the problem of lead-based paint poisoning. The bill addresses head-on the
fundamental defects in the current regulatory system that have
frustrated lead hazard control activities. It mandates affirmative
inspection and lead hazard control duties, moving decisively away
from the "housing paradigm" and the "secondary prevention model"
that allow property owners to ignore hazards and disregard the
rights of tenants to safe housing, and that fail to prevent poisonings
from occurring. 370 It establishes clear and health-protective standards of care,371 which will stimulate financing and insurance for
properties with lead-based paint hazards. 372 Its flexible hazard control approach will enable owners to remedy lead-based paint hazards at reasonable costs, addressing a central stumbling block for
greater control efforts.373 In addition, the bill provides for strong
public and private enforcement.
Thus, Senate Bill 2080 is an excellent building block for future legislation. Stakeholders in California should continue their
efforts to work out the remaining unresolved issues, and also to
clarify and shore up areas of uncertainty. This process has begun,
and, in early 1997, Senate Bill 2080 (in basically the same form
as considered in the legislature in 1996) was reintroduced by Assemblywoman Sheila Kuehl as Assembly Bill 481. 374 Senate Bill
1960 was reintroduced (with some minor modifications) by Senator
Tim Leslie as Senate Bill 718. 375
VIII.

SOME LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA'S COLLABORATIVE
DRAFTING PROCESS

California's experience-the stakeholders' success in forging
a consensus on most issues but their inability to quickly translate
this consensus into legislation-provides important lessons for other
370. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text; see also Schukoske, Evolving
Paradigm, supra note 72, at 539-559.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 281-303.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 328-331, 346.
373. See UNDERSTANDING TITLE X, supra note 80, at 3 (describing some groups'
past attempts to use the high cost of removing all lead-based paint in housing as an excuse
for ignoring lead hazards entirely).
374. See supra note 271.
375. See supra note 271.
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collaborative drafting efforts, particularly in the environmental
area.

A. The Growth of Public/Private Partnerships
Generally, the use of collaborative partnerships to address environmental problems is increasing. 376 In part, these partnerships
build on the experience of negotiated rulemaking, in which an
agency and significant stakeholders participate in facilitated, faceto-face interaction designed to produce a consensus, in place of
formal rulemaking procedures. 377 Such rulemaking has been particularly popular in the environmental field; EPA has been involved
in close to half of all federally negotiated rulemaking. 378 Public/private partnerships have been advocated as promising a style of
decisionmaking that is less confrontational than the traditional rulemaking and litigation approach; lessens opposition to regulation;
offers flexibility to the regulated community; and provides a stronger
voice to affected communities.379 Such partnerships have been used
recently to help resolve prominent disputes over water quality standards in the San Francisco Bay-Delta380 and to develop a plan for
376. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Foreword: The Search for Regulatory
Alternatives, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. at viii, xii-xvi (1996) (noting that such partnerships
are a central element of the Clinton Administration's approach to reforming environmental law); John Cushman & Timothy Egan, Battles on Conservation Are Reaping
Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1996, at Al ("[A] hallmark of the [Clinton] Administration's environmental policy is the premise that consensus can work, letting everybody
win.").
377. See Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 136-37 (1985); see also Negotiated
Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994) (establishing procedures for negotiated
rulemaking).
378. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1212 n.22 (1994).
379. See Thompson, supra note 376, at 11-13; see also Bruce Levi & Larry Spears,
Public Policy Consensus Building: Connecting to Change For Captllring the Future, 70
N.D. L. REv. 311, 323-24 (1994) (noting that public/private collaborative decisionmaking
can alleviate future conflict, strengthen long term relationships among parties, and help
resolve public policy conflicts with fewer resources). But see Thompson, supra note 376,
at xiv-xvi (describing limitations of partnerships, including the time and resources
involved in participation; the lack of incentive to participate rather than pursue individual
relief; the fact that government agencies have competing mandates and lack discretionary
authority; and concerns about enforceability and lack of openness).
380. See Elizabeth A. Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustain ability,
67 U. COLO. L. REv. 341 (1996).
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improving air quality and visibility in the Grand Canyon. 381 They
are currently being utilized to formulate solutions to several complex regional air quality problems,382 to develop industry-wide pollution control standards as part of President Clinton's "Common
Sense lnitiative",383 to address environmental restoration efforts in
South Florida,384 and to manage some national parks. 385 EPA recently stated that it "now routinely evaluates the appropriateness
of using consensus-based rulemaking as it issues or revises regulations." 386
Public-private partnerships also have been used extensively to
develop lead-based paint legislation. They are well-suited for use
in this context because of the far-reaching costs and effects and
the enormous range of interests implicated in any potential solution
to the problem of lead-based paint in housing. Congress mandated
that the Title X Task Force follow this model. 387 The Title X Task
Force was able to forge a remarkable degree of consensus among
most participants, although its report drew sharp dissent from several tenants' advocates and environmental groupS.388 Likewise, Con381. See Margaret L. Claiborne, Regulation by Consensus: The Expanded Use of
Regulatory Negotiation under the Clean Air Act, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 44' (1996).
Another noteworthy but unsuccessful example was the effort of the National Commission
on Superfund to develop consensus recommendations for reforming the federal Superfund
program. See THE KEYSTONE CTR. & THE ENVTL. LAW CTR. OF VT. LAW SCH., FINAL
CONSENSUS REpORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SUPERFUND at v (1994). This
Commission was comprised of 25 members, including representatives of the manufacturing, chemical, petroleum, insurance, and banking sectors; small businesses; communities
of color; environmental, citizen, labor, and public interest groups; municipal, state, and
tribal governments; and academia. See id. It produced a consensus set of recommendations,
but Congress failed to take any action on Superfund in 1994. See id.
382. See Claiborne, supra note 381, at 44.
383. See Carol M. Browner, The Common Sense Initiative: A New Generation of
Environmelltal Protection (visited Feb. 3. 1997) <http:www.epagov/commonsense/speech2.
txt> (text of speech prepared for delivery July 20, 1994).
384. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESTORING THE EVERGLADES-PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL EFFORTS, GAOIRCED 96-5 (1995).
385. See Carl Nolte, Presidio Trust Bill: A Turning Point in park's History, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 4, 1996, at A21 (describing legislation adopted in 1996 that created Presidio
Trust, a non-profit government corporation, to manage Presidio National Park; the Trust
is described as a unique public/private partnership). See generally Ralph Regula, The
Public Must Be a Partner in National Parks, ENVTL. F., July-Aug. 1995, at 38-39
(advocating public-private partnerships for managing our national parks).
386. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Negotiation and Consensus-based Rulemaking (last modified May 22, 1996) <http://www.epagov/partners/reinvent/rncr. htm>.
387. See 42 U.S.C. § 4852a (1994).
388. See Title X Task Force, supra note 1, at 200-04.
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necticut, 389 Delaware,390 Maine,391 Massachusetts,392 Maryland,393 MisSOuri,394 New Jersey, 395 New York,396 OhiO,397 Rhode Island,398 VeImont,399
and Wisconsin40o have all used some type of broad-based, legislatively mandated task: force, commission, or advisory group to help
develop lead legislation. In three of these states, Massachusetts,
Maryland and Vermont, the efforts produced significant legislation,
although the Maryland law in particular has been faulted for being
unbalanced. 401

389. See Telephone Interview with Doug Farquhar, Nat'l Conference of State
Legislators, Denver, Colo. (Mar. 5, 1997) [hereinafter Farquhar Interview].
390. See Del. Exec. Order No. 16 (Dec. 22, 1993).
391. See S.B. 528, 117th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 1995) available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Text95 File; see also Farquhar Interview, supra note 389.
392. Massachusetts has used several such bodies to deal with lead-based paint. In
1985, the legislature established a Special Legislative Commission on Childhood Lead
Poisoning; in 1991, the Massachusetts Attorney General formed a statewide task force on
lead poisoning; and, subsequent to that, the Massachusetts House Speaker established a
special committee to recommend a model lead paint Jaw. See Tiller, slIpra note 73, at 271;
Conservation Law Foundation, Understanding the Massachusetts Lead Law 1 (May 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
393. In Maryland some property owners and children's advocates joined forces to
sponsor lead legislation, but the bill included a tax on the sale of paint to finance lead
hazard control efforts and intense opposition from the paint industry derailed the proposal.
See Jackson L. Anderson et aI., Analyzing the Massachusetts and Maryland Lead Laws:
New Approaches to Lead Poisoning Prevention and Affordable Housing Preservation 5-6
(undated draft, on file with author). Because there was "a 'virtual stalemate in lead-poisoning prevention efforts" by 1992, the Maryland Legislature appointed the Lead Paint
Poisoning Commission. See Anderson & Kershner, slIpra note 213, at 51. The Commission
consisted of 15 members appointed by the Governor, as well as two legislators serving as
ex officio members. See Anderson et aI., SlIpra, at 6. The members included the heads of
the state departments of health, housing, and environment, as well as representatives of
the following stakeholders: local government, insurers, lenders, property owners, child
health and youth advocacy groups, a child advocate, child care providers, a health care
provider, paint manufacturers, a lead hazard professional, and the parents of a lead-poisoned child. See id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., EN VIR. § 6-807 (1996). This broad
membership is typical of the task forces and commissions in other states.
394. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 701.302 (West Supp. 1997); Mark Meyer, Lead Poisoning: Will Missollri's New Legislation Get the Lead alit?, 2 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POlly REV.
16,22-23 (1994) (discussing legislative proposal for and establishment of Commission on
Lead Poisoning).
395. See Farquhar Interview, slIpra note 389.
396. See N.Y. PUB.. HEALTH LAW § 1370-b (McKinney Supp. 1996) (establishing
broad-based public and" private advisory council to develop comprehensive statewide plan
to prevent lead poisoning).
397. See 1994 Ohio Laws S.B. 162, at 1637-39; Farquhar Interview, slIpra note 389.
398. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-24.6-6 (1996) (establishing commission on environmental lead).
399. See 1993 VT. ACTS & RESOLVES 94, § 4.
400. See Farquhar Interview, slIpra note 389.
401. See SlIpra text accompanying notes 248-251.
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On the other hand, the experience in these three states illustrates at least one important disadvantage to the partnership modelthe strong likelihood that, after a cooperative drafting process is
concluded, parties will unilaterally seek to reopen issues in the
legislature. Unlike regulatory negotiations, a consensus drafting or
bargaining process results in no binding commitment by the parties
not to challenge the regulatory agreement. The consensus will hold
so long as the parties feel a moral obligation to honor the agreements forged or believe that they cannot achieve a better result
outside the process, but often there exist strong incentives for the
parties to try to reach a better deal with legislators.402 In Maryland,
for instance, dissatisfied property owners introduced a competing
measure and successfully watered down some of the Commission's
recommendations. 403 After the bill was passed, the property owners
tried to modify major statutory provisions more profoundly, and
they have since caused paralyzing fights over the bill's implementing regulations.404 Likewise, in Massachusetts, comprehensive legislation was passed over the virulent objections of the Massachusetts Rental Housing Association, even though the Association had
fully participated in the consensus process throughout. 405
B. California's Experience
In California, several factors explain why the collaborative
process ultimately fell short of its goal of enacting legislation.
402. See Anderson et aI., supra note 393, at 12 (observing that interest groups with
unequal political power threaten to undermine balance sought by consensus process as
they continue to press for more advantageous provisions); cf. Lawrence Susskind & Alan
Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 311, 344 (1980) ("It is critical [in environmental dispute resolution] to develop
mechanisms that will bind all bargaining parties to the terms of their agreements.").
403. See Telephone Interview with Jackson L. Anderson, Dir. of Finance and Ins.,
Nat'l Ctr. for Lead Safe Housing (July 18, 1996) [hereinafter Anderson Interview]. The
Maryland legislature also failed to pass a universal lead screening measure, which had
been a specific condition demanded by childrens' health advocates for support of the
overall scheme. See Anderson et aI., supra note 393, at 8.
404. See Anderson et aI., supra note 393, at 8; Anderson Interview, supra note 403.
405. See Pollock Interview, supra note 348. Similarly, in Vermont, parties on each
side tried to revisit aspects of the Commission's report that they disliked. See Telephone
Interview with Richard Bland, Vice-President and General Counsel, Vermont Mutual Ins.
Group (July 12, 1995) [hereinafter Bland Interview]. Interestingly, at the conclusion of
Ohio's drafting process, the parties were not even asked to formally endorse the Commission's recommendations on behalf of their constituencies. See Greenberg Interview, supra
note 328.
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One of the most significant hurdles was the perceived lack of
urgency of the lead poisoning problem on the part of some key
stakeholders and their constituent members. Apart from the growing number of childhood poisonings occurring in the state, few
outward signs of crisis-such as massive litigation, widespread
housing abandonment, intensive media attention, large-scale withdrawal of insurance coverage-were apparent. In Massachusetts
and Maryland, in contrast, there was a palpable sense of crisis
among all parties preceding the passage of legislation.406 Both states
had been centers of childhood lead poisoning litigation, with several thousand suits filed in each state over the past fifteen years;
public health agencies were overwhelmed by the number of lead
poisoning cases; and property owners had witnessed a drastic curtailment in insurance for lead liability claims and a cutback in
financing. for lead hazard control work. 407 This sense of urgency
focused all parties on finding a solution. Thus, in Mary land,
[l]andlords, particularly those in Baltimore City, began clamoring for liability reform and increased insurance availability,
and ominously warned that affordable housing would undergo
further deterioration and reduction if nothing was done to
protect the state's rental property industry. Childhood health
advocates, aware that children were still being poisoned at an
alarming rate, demanded screening programs and enforcement
of local housing codes and the lead abatement regulations.
Interestingly, despite the sometimes diametrically opposed views
of these two groups, all concerned about the health of children
and the preservation of an already depressed low income housing market agreed that action was needed to seek a comprehensive solution.408
.

406. See Anderson et aI., supra note 393, at 1-5.
407. See id. In 1992, there were 1300 open cases pending in Baltimore alone. See
id. at 5. The key cities in each state-Boston and Baltimore-had high rates of childhood,
poisoning, and also had a large share of older, low-income, poorly maintained housing
stock. See id. at 1.
408. Id. at 5. While the situation in Vermont was far less acute, the shadow cast by
the experience in other Northeastern states, in particular the huge number of tort cases,
the disappearance of liability insurance, and the requirement for expensive abatement
controls, created a sense of urgency. See Bland Interview, supra note 405; Francis
Interview, supra note 328. Property owners and insurers also feared that the Vermont
judiciary would find landlords strictly liable for damages from lead hazards. See Bland
Interview, supra note 405; Francis Interview, supra note 328.
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The perceived lack of urgency in California translated into
only limited support for the legislation by some stakeholders, and
a reluctance to engage in bottom-line bargaining by others, both of
which hurt the negotiations and legislative progress. The challenge
now confronting California and other states is to convince stakeholders and their constituents that the situation is in fact dire even
though all the symptoms of a crisis are not yet manifest,. and that
it will only become worse without prompt action. The implementation of Title X's disclosure rule in late 1996409 should help considerably in this regard by raising consciousness among stakeholders about the dangers of lead poisoning.
Related to the perceived lack of urgency was the fact that not
all of the parties involved in the California drafting process were
ready to make deep compromises, or believed that the consensus
process would produce as good an outcome as would pursuing their
interests individually. A belief that the consensus process will further one's interests is an important precondition for meaningful
compromise. The lending community's trade association, for instance, stuck to an extreme position, demanding complete liability
relief without the obligation to perform meaningful lead hazard
controls, and making little effort to negotiate a reasonable compromise. Other parties adopted similar stances on different issues.
Vermont's process provides an interesting counterpoint. There, all
parties agreed to very serious concessions to produce a, final, although modest, bill.410 Consumer and environmental advocates accepted a set of hazard controls that target the most egregious
conditions but leave some homes with lead hazards; property owners agreed to obtain only limited liability relief as a result of
carrying out these measures; and key insurance companies offered
to write insurance despite the lack of a truly health-protective
standard and a conclusive presumption of reasonable care in the
statute. 411
Other factors also contributed to Senate Bill 2080's legislative
defeat. California's use of a privately organized task force allowed
409. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text
410. See supra notes 252-257 and accompanying text
411. See Francis Interview, supra note 328. The parties were strongly influenced by
the popular anti-regulatory mood and a political environment that was unfavorable for
sweeping legislation, as well as by the state's ongoing financial crisis that had left little
public funding av.ailable. See id.
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the stakeholders to move significantly faster than would otherwise
have been possible in developing recommendations and drafting
legislation. On the other hand, having a formal mandate from the
legislature or a state agency, or having legislators or agency heads
chair the task force, would have added to the task force's legitimacy and possibly made the participating stakeholders more accountable to each other. For example, one of the key stakeholders,
the realtors, waited until the very end to participate substantially
in the drafting process, and at that point played an unconstructive
role. Presumably, stakeholders would be less inclined to undermine
the drafting process in this manner if they were negotiating faceto-face with a state legislator or a powerful agency official. Anecdotal evidence based on the experience of Vermont's Lead Paint
Hazard Commission supports this view.412 The chair of that commission credits its success in part to the presence of two influential
legislators on the commission who strongly supported the process
and worked hard in the legislative arena to see that the commission's recommendations were adopted into law.413
Although the" California legislation developed from over two
years of workshops and drafting sessions, the process still probably
moved too rapidly for many of the stakeholders. Lead-based paint
poisoning is a complex issue; the solutions are neither obvious nor
easy. Some underlying issues, like tort liability relief, are inherently controversial. Moreover, all of the key issues, including the
appropriate control standards, liability, and insurance, are interrelated, thus necessitating a comprehensive solution. It takes considerable time for stakeholders to educate their constituent organizations about the complex array of underlying issues and to build
support for the compromises inherent in a consensus process, especially in a state as large and diverse as California. A number of
parties did not have sufficient time to complete this effort. This
problem was exacerbated by the fact that, once the drafting process
was concluded and attention shifted to the legislature, there was
no effective mechanism for ongoing communication with all the
stakeholders. These factors explain in part why two key stakehold412. See id.
413. See id. On the other hand, having a legislatively mandated task force in
Maryland did not stop some parties from seeking to undermine the consensus reached by
the stakeholder bargaining process. The Maryland example is discussed supra at notes
403-404 and accompanying text.
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ers-the property owners and the tenants' advocates-did not remain unified while the bill was being considered in the legislature.
Divisions within these groups developed due to unresolved concerns about the costs of lead hazard controls, the triggers for controls, the impacts of these controls on affordable housing, and other
issues. These factors also help explain why other parties, such as
advocates for affordable housing, local environmental agencies,
and some grass-roots environmental organizations, were not able
to offer their unqualified support for the bilL
Some community advocates refused to support the legislation
on principle because it preempted the ability of local communities
to set more stringent lead poisoning standards. On the other hand,
this preemptive aspect of the bill, and the statewide unif9rmity in
lead hazard control standards that would result, were of central
importance to property owners, as well as to some tenant representatives who favored the idea of all tenants in the state enjoying
uniform protections. As many commentators have noted, attempts
to reach consensus solutions work poorly where there are deeply
held beliefs or values in conflict. 414
Finally, insufficient attention was paid to the process of getting
legislation enacted, which is different from the process of building
consensus in a task force. In particular, the coalition of groups
advocating Senate Bill 2080 failed to develop a clear legislative
strategy before the bill was introduced. The major advocate for the
bill in the legislature was Lead Safe California, a highly effective
convener of the stakeholders, but an organization without either
lobbying expertise or a constituent base that it could draw upon.
None of the key stakeholders were ready to assume ownership of
the bill or undertake major lobbying efforts on its behalf. The
legislative schedule in California is demanding, with numerous
political minefields and opportunities for bills to be derailed. Senate Bill 2080 fell victim to several of these forces: the exacting
deadlines of the legislative session; the lack of firm support by key
legislative leaders; the determination of key committee votes on
Senate Bill 2080 by legislators' paybacks on unrelated political
issues;415 and finally, the well-financed efforts of interests working

414. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 377, at 139, 152.
415. See Widess Interview, supra note 258.
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to derail the measure (over $1.3 million was spent lobbying against
the measure).416

c.

Summary

The consensus on lead reached by California's stakeholders is
highly significant, given the scope and complexity of the underlying issues, the diversity of the stakeholders involved, and the relatively short time frame within which consensus was achieved. Thus,
California's experience with a collaborative drafting process supports the continued use of similar task forces to tackle cross-cutting
'- environmental issues like lead-based paint poisoning. The process
would have benefited from more time for the stakeholders to educate their constituencies, a better legislative strategy, and more
tangible evidence convincing all parties of the need to act without
delay. In the future, advocates should adopt a broader educational
strategy to mobilize public attention to the problem. They should
also identify key legislative leaders who will make enactment of a
comprehensive lead law a major priority, and involve the legislators
and their staff sooner in the drafting process.

IX.

CONCLUSION

Each year, childhood lead poisoning irrevocably harms tens of
thousands of children. Its persistence is particularly tragic given
that it is largely preventable and that its predominant source is so
clearly identifiable.
Traditional approaches to controlling lead-based paint hazards
have made only halting progress over the past twenty-five years.
There is thus a compelling need for a new framework to address
the problem. Because no solution is possible without the participation of the diverse sectors of society affected by lead-based
416. See CALIFORNIA PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, SACRAMENTO'S UNFRIENDLY
WATERS: A CALPIRG STUDY OF LOBBYING EXPENDITURES, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS,
AND THE FATE OF 10 BILLS IN THE 1995-1996 LEGISLATIVE SESSION OF THE CALIFORNIA
STATE LEGISLATURE, app. 1 (1996). This lobbying was carried out by the California
Association of Realtors, the Western League of Savings and Loan Institutions, and a
regional homeowners' association. See id.
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paint, this new framework must accommodate the interests of a
broad range of stakeholders.
Over the past two years, California's stakeholders, lead by a
neutral party, have crafted a comprehensive answer to the leadbased paint problem through a broadly inclusive drafting process.
The approach is reasonable and workable, and sets standards that
are both health-protective and feasible. It provides a model for
other' states to follow. While the costs of this solution will be
substantial, the costs of not acting in terms of both human suffering, and the billions of dollars lost to higher medical costs, increased special education expenditures, and other societal expenditures' will be far greater.

